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The analysis of domestic incidents of terrorism has revealed many gaps in our 
Nation’s capability to effectively manage the multi-jurisdictional response.  Although 
many gaps have been addressed through implementation of measures based on lessons 
learned, the most pervasive unresolved issue remains the ability to properly identify first 
response personnel on incident scenes.  The nature of incidents of terrorism requires force 
protection to be a priority because of the threat secondary attack. Identity must be 
established and authenticated to protect responders and prevent infiltration to perpetrate a 
secondary attack.  This thesis examines and evaluates several options for closing this 
pervasive identity management capability gap.  The current decentralized identity system, 
a defined and typed response resource for identity management, and the federal identity 
project initiated under HSPD-12 are examined and evaluated as mechanisms for 
improving on-scene identity management in the response to incidents of terrorism.  The 
thesis argues the development of a standardized nationwide responder identity token that 
can be rapidly authenticated and establishing dedicated identity management response 
resources are essential to improving the response multi-jurisdictional and catastrophic 
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I. OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The date is July 17, 1996.  Emergency services personnel from Suffolk County, 
NY and the United States Coast Guard respond to a report of a catastrophic explosion and 
crash of a passenger airliner over the ocean off the southern coast of Long Island.  The 
initial assumption is a nexus to terrorism.  The East Moriches Coast Guard Station is 
designated as the operations command post, staging area, and evidence collection point.  
As the incident shifts from response to recovery, personnel from various response 
disciplines and levels of government stream into the station.  Among them is Lieutenant 
Colonel David Williams of the U.S. Army Reserve.  LTC Williams, dressed in his U.S. 
Army Reserve flight suit, presents identification, enters the site, and assists in the 
operation by landing helicopters on the designated helipads.  On the third day of his 
work, LTC Williams is questioned concerning his identity and affiliation.  Following a 
brief investigation, LTC Williams is identified as an impostor, escorted from the 
property, and charged by the Suffolk County Police.1
Identity is defined as the “the collective aspect of the set of characteristics by 
which a thing is definitively recognizable or known.”2  In the incident described above, 
the set of characteristics that assumed an identity consisted of a uniform, unverifiable 
paper credentials, and a demeanor consistent with a military officer.  These 
characteristics allowed the impostor to pass a brief security inspection and work within a 
‘secured’ site for several days. This incident highlights the need for a stronger method of 
identity verification.  The infiltration of the Flight 800 response and recovery operation 
evidences only one of several dimensions of a comprehensive identity management 
capability gap for terrorism incident response and recovery operations. 
The current identity management system for first responders has left a nation-
wide capability gap.  The decentralized system has resulted in as many different forms of 
first responder identification as there are federal agencies, and state and local 
 
1 Joe Haberstroh and Steve Wick, "Military Impostor Fools Coast Guard," New York Newsday (27 July 
1996). 
2 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., s.v. "Identity." 
2 
governments.  The lack of standardization and interoperability among forms of 
identification is problematic when confronting a large-scale, multi-jurisdictional response 
to a suspected incident of terrorism.  In addition to the response to the crash of TWA 
Flight 800, this lack of capability is documented in the after-action reports of the 
response to every major domestic incident of terrorism, specifically the 1995 Oklahoma 
City Bombing and the 9/11 responses to both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  
In the following sections, specific cases will be examined that highlight this pervasive 
problem and support the implementation of a comprehensive first responder identity 
management framework that provides identity authentication, training and capability 
levels, on-scene personnel accountability, and protection from secondary attack. 
The question for research is: What is the best policy option to close the first 
responder identity management capability gap? Three policy options will be analyzed, 
including the current decentralized identity management system, Identity Management 
Teams for Incident Response, and First Responder Identity Smart Cards.  The results of 
this research can be utilized to inform policy decisions regarding the closure of the 
identity management capability gap for terrorism incident response and recovery 
operations. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The analysis presented in this thesis compares three policy options for closing the 
identity management capability gap along six evaluative dimensions.  Four of these 
dimensions were derived from the review of after-action reports of the response to 
suspected and confirmed incidents of terrorism.  In each case, the reports highlighted 
identity management deficiencies for incident response.  The remaining dimensions are 
derived from traditional public policy concerns.  Three alternative approaches to identity 
management are evaluated across these criteria to determine the best identity 
management policy option for improving terrorism incident response. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION: LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT FROM TERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE 
The identity management capability gap for terrorism incident response is a 
pervasive but solvable problem.  The post 9/11 focus on the development of capabilities 
related to incident response, including acquisition of CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, 
3 
                                                
Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive) detection equipment, response apparatus, and personal 
protective equipment have left out the essential component of identity management.  
Despite the glaring lack of capability, it has been all but ignored in homeland security 
preparedness efforts targeted at first response personnel. 
Discussion of identity management is also hampered by the absence of an 
extensive body of knowledge or current debate on the issue.  This section begins to 
address this shortcoming by examining the question, is first responder identity 
management really a problem?  Current accessible information bulletins and the After-
Action Reports (AAR) of the response to domestic incidents of terrorism will be 
examined to develop the answer to this essential question. 
The problem of identity management for terrorism incident response begins prior 
to the TWA Flight 800 disaster and has several dimensions beyond simple authentication 
of personal identity.  The problem was identified in the response to the nation’s first 
major domestic terrorist incident: the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, OK.  On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated 4800 lbs. of 
Ammonium Nitrate mixed with fuel oil loaded in a Ryder box truck outside the Murrah 
Federal building. The blast caused a catastrophic collapse of the building resulting in the 
deaths of 168 people and injuries to 500 others.  The ensuing public safety response and 
recovery efforts revealed major gaps in identity management capabilities at all levels of 
government. 
Within two hours of the blast, the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) had 
established a controlled perimeter around the incident site.3  Identification of personnel 
immediately became an issue.  Initially, the OCPD moved its Permit and Identification 
section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges. The operation lasted only a 
few hours as supplies were quickly exhausted.4  The OCPD continued to issue alternative 
forms of identification. Due to rain and lighting conditions, the location of the identity 
station changed three times.  When agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
arrived, they also began issuing identification, causing confusion for those manning the 
 
3 City of Oklahoma City, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing April 19, 1995: Final Report 
(Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection Publications, 1996) , 369. 
4 Ibid, 39. 
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perimeter.  FBI and OCPD finally consolidated their operations and issued one form of 
identification, operating from a vacant warehouse building.  The building was large 
enough to hold the up to 100 people who were waiting for identification after filling out 
permit forms and completing necessary identification checks.  The combined 
identification operation issued approximately twenty thousand passes over a seventeen-
day period.5  In the publication Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned for 
Other Communities, an unnamed Oklahoma City Law Enforcement Officer claimed: 
“Over 28,000 identity badges were issued during the Oklahoma City response and 
recovery effort. It took days to establish a central issuing agency. A predetermined ID 
system would have greatly reduced ID chaos.”6 Included among the lessons learned of 
the document is the important recommendation to “Establish a Site ID 
System…Controlling access to the site is an immediate and on-going need.”7
The need for a comprehensive identity management solution was also evident in 
the 9/11 response to the Pentagon.  Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an 
identification system for incident scene security and accountability.  The system 
consisted of 2,000 colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene.  In the 
tremendous public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington 
County deployed its identity management system two days into the response. Once the 
system was utilized, the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.8
The on-scene identity management efforts that followed included a system that 
took up to two hours to process and provide credentials to relief crews for entry into the 
site because of limited computers and lack of a central database.9  The lack of a 
comprehensive identity management system also led one Arlington County firefighter to 
 
5 City of Oklahoma City, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing April 19, 1995: Final Report, 
219-220. 
6 Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City- Seven 
Years Later: Lessons Learned for Other Communities (Oklahoma City: MIPT, 2002), 11. 
7 Ibid, 10. 
8 Titan Systems Corporation, Arlington County: After Action Report on the Response to the September 
11 Terrorist Attack at the Pentagon (Arlington, VA: n.d.), C-23. 
9 Ibid, A-69. 
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observe, “A volunteer firefighter tee shirt was the only required identification.”10  At the 
request of the incident commander, the United States Secret Service instituted a more 
efficient credentialing system several days into the response. 
The identity management recommendations from the Pentagon AAR are similar 
to the lessons learned first reported in the Oklahoma City AAR.  The Pentagon AAR 
concluded, “Arlington County should work with…emergency response and volunteer 
organizations to implement a uniform identification system.  Such a system should be in 
place and used routinely…”11  These incidents indicate the need for a comprehensive 
identity management system that delivers the necessary capabilities to support incident 
response operations. 
The September 11, 2001 response to World Trade Center terrorist attacks is not 
documented by an official after-action report and, as a result, there is limited documented 
information concerning identity management at the incident scene.  The McKinsey & Co. 
report prepared for the New York City Police Department entitled Improving NYPD 
Emergency Preparedness and Response does provide some information regarding the 
problems associated with identification on the WTC incident scene. 
The report asserts that it took several days to secure the perimeter.  It also details 
the problems caused by this delay.  The report states that “due to inconsistent control of 
access and absence of an effective credentialing system, perimeter security not 
adequately established, allowing large numbers of unnecessary personnel to enter site.”12  
Although the report does not contain a sanctioned set of recommendations or lessons 
learned, the challenges faced during the response and recovery operation can be 
discerned from the content of the report.  Based on the evidence provided above, it can be 
discerned that perimeter security and identity management proved to be significant 
challenges without an effective solutions. 
The previous sections identify many of the gaps associated with past responses to 
domestic terrorism incidents.  Knowing identity management is a problem, in the past 
 
10  Titan Systems Corporation, Arlington County, A-20. 
11 Ibid, C-28. 
12 McKinsey & Company, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response (New York: 
McKinsey & Company, 2002), 17. 
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and in the future, but avoiding steps to solve, would once again demonstrate that the 
nation suffers from a “failure of imagination” as described in the 9/11 Commission 
Report.13  If we reasonably know what is possible, it should be included in our planning 
and preparation. 
The opening vignette revealed the ability to exploit current identity documents for 
secure site infiltration.  This gap could be exploited to perpetrate a secondary attack.  In 
Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response it is identified that the “risk of 
secondary attack was not made a priority.”14  This reveals that the possibility of 
secondary attack at incident scenes such as the WTC response must be considered.  The 
May 2005 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin identifies the two components of a 
secondary attack as follows: “The first one draws in emergency responders, regardless of 
the extent of deaths and injuries. In the second, the responders themselves become the 
target and include not only law enforcement, fire and rescue, and emergency medical 
personnel but civilian Good Samaritans as well.”15
The exploitation of unverifiable identity to perpetrate a secondary attack is a 
plausible conclusion based on its pervasive failures in previous incident response.  The 
utilization of this gap for terrorist activity is also advanced by the Department of 
Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation joint bulletin released in 
December 2004 titled Potential Terrorist Use of Public Safety or Service Industry 
Uniforms, Identification, or Vehicles.16  The bulletin warns of the potential exploitation 
of the unverifiable identity characteristics of the public safety and service industry 
(uniforms, paper identification, vehicles, etc.) for terrorist activity.  Possible scenarios 
include the use public safety and service industry uniforms or vehicles to perpetrate a 
 
13 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton 
& Co, 2004), 336. 
14 McKinsey & Company, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, 17. 
15 Brian Houghton, and Jonathan Schacter, "Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Implications for Local 
Responders," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 74, no. 5 (May 2005), 
htttp://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2005/may2005/may05/leb.htm#page11/ [accessed January 15, 2006]. 
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Information 
Bulletin: Potential Terrorist Use of Public Safety or Service Industry Uniforms, Identification, or Vehicles 
(Washington, D.C.: DHS, n.d.), 1-4, http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/DHSFBI%20alert.pdf. 
(accessed 10 June 2006). 
7 
secondary attack on first responders.  The exploitation of these unverifiable identity 
characteristics could allow access to critical sites, such as staging areas, where a 
secondary attack would prevent rescue efforts and potentially cause mass casualties to 
first responders.  Although a secondary attack can also come from a pre-placed device, 
the possibility exists for an attack precipitated by infiltration through the unverifiable 
flash identification, uniform, and vehicle paradigm. 
The after-action and related reports detailing the response to the three major 
domestic terrorist attacks reveal a common problem that, to date has not been effectively 
resolved.  The common element among the lessons learned from the responses to each 
incident reveals that identity management failure is endemic to terrorism incident 
response. From Oklahoma City, OK to Arlington, VA to New York City, NY, identity 
management is a glaring response capability gap.  Despite AAR recommendations 
regarding improvements needed in identity management dating back to 1995, little has 
been accomplished toward the recognition and development of a solution. Identity 
management is not simply a local, state, or regional problem, but a national problem that 
has been largely ignored. 
D. THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING AND CHOOSING THE BEST 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
The definition of the identity management problem for incident response leads to 
a second, equally critical question; what is an appropriate set of criteria with which to 
evaluate the effectiveness of identity management solutions?  The evaluative criteria 
defined below are derived from two different perspectives.  First, the criteria reflect gaps 
exposed through the analysis of the response to previous incidents of terrorism and the 
consideration of future incident scenarios.  Second, the criteria include traditional public 
policy concerns.  These two sources of criteria serve to balance a theoretical solution of 
improving incident response with the realities of the implementation of public sector 
programs.  The purpose of the following sections is to examine these evaluative criteria 
in more detail as an introduction to analyses presented later in the thesis. 
1. Criteria for Evaluation: Failures of Identity Management for 
Terrorism Incident Response 
The collective experiences from the response to major incidents of terrorism 
detailed above reveal common problems for identity management and terrorism incident 
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response.  The problems as identified and defined provide the framework for a solution.  
The common problems exposed in the analysis form the basis of the criteria for the 
evaluation of alternatives to improve identity management for terrorism incident 
response.  These diagnosed problems of the past are then coupled with the possibilities 
for future response to ensure proper evaluation of alternative solutions. 
The four criteria described in this section provide the evaluative elements 
necessary to improve terrorism incident response.  These elements, when included with 
the additional criteria contained in the following section, form the basis for effective 
evaluation of alternative approaches to solving the problem posed by on-scene identity 
management for terrorism incident response. 
a. Identity Authentication 
In Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat, the key to 
identity authentication is described as “access to data to assist in the validation, 
verification, and authentication of personal identifiers.”17  Validation of the data is 
predicated on trust.  The heart of identity management lies in the creation and 
maintenance of trust.  Trust allows for a consumer to have a defined level of certainty in 
the authenticity of a credential based on the process by which it was issued and the 
security of the token.  The trust model provides a level of certainty to the consumer to 
answer the question, “Who is this?”  Certainty and trust are measured through a two-
pronged test of product and process. 
In order to provide certainty and trust in an identity credential, it must be 
sound in both product and process.  The process must provide assurances that an 
individual has been vetted through an identity proofing process.  The process should 
include common criteria and assurances prior to enrollment and token issuance.  The 
more stringent the criteria and assurances are, the higher the level of certainty and trust.  
Strong criteria may include elements such as background investigations, collection and 
verification of biometric information, and requirements for presentation of certain 
identity documents prior to issuance. 
 
17 Gary R. Gordon and Norman A. Wilcox, Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat 
(Utica: Utica College, Economic Crime Institute, 2003), 6. 
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The second prong of the test is the product, or identity token (document, 
card, or item that is used to establish identity) itself.  Trust and certainty are developed 
through a product that is counterfeit resistant.  The ability of the product to resist change 
and/or duplication develops certainty and trust.  The stronger the product is to resist 
counterfeit, the higher the level of trust and certainty in the answer to the question, “Who 
is this?” 
Process and product come together to form a trust model.  Both aspects 
must be sound to develop certainty.  A stringent vetting process backed with a token that 
can be easily reproduced and altered does not create trust.  Likewise an identity token that 
is strongly resistant to tampering, but was issued without criteria or assurances, also 
creates uncertainty and is not trusted.  Identity authentication is marrying sound process 
and a tamper resistant product to create certainty and trust. 
President Ronald Reagan often quoted the Russian Proverb “Doveryai no 
Proveryai” which translates to “trust, but verify” to describe his foreign policy dealings 
with the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s.18  “Trust, but verify” is an appropriate mantra 
for first responder identity.  The solution requires a framework that can provide 
verification.  The infiltration of the response to the TWA Flight 800 disaster evidenced 
the vulnerability and limitation of trust in the current unverifiable picture/ paper based 
identity management system.  If the TWA disaster had been a terrorist attack, the current 
system would not have mitigated the threat of secondary attack against first responders. 
b. Rapid In-Processing 
In-processing for incident response requires that identity and affiliation be 
verified, the responder be enrolled or logged into the scene, the level of site access 
determined, and accountability be maintained by tracking personnel on-scene.  Rapid in-
processing for identity management is the ability to perform these tasks efficiently with 
minimal impact on the completion of tactical objectives for incident response.  The lack 
of rapid in-processing to incident scenes is documented as a failing of identity 
management for terrorism incident response.  The AAR’s for both the Oklahoma City 
and Pentagon responses indicate that it took hours to provide credentials to personnel for 
 
18 AP Foreign Desk, "Excerpts from the Reagan Interview with 4 Correspondents," New York Times, 4 
December 1987. 
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entry into the scenes.  Speed of processing, however, is the competing factor to identity 
authentication in an incident response setting.  Perimeter personnel must weigh security 
against the immediate need for personnel at an incident scene.  Due to the inadequacies of 
the current identity management system, perimeter personnel are forced to revert to 
unverifiable credentials and the uniform, emergency vehicle, demeanor consistent with 
position identity construct.  Any identity management solution must provide a level of 
security and speed that does not hinder, but enhances incident response.  The speed of 
processing should be consistent with the time that would be required for perimeter 
personnel to check “flash” identification and ask follow-up questions. 
c. Interoperability 
The Department of Homeland Security SAFECOM program defines 
interoperability as “the ability of emergency responders to work seamlessly with other 
systems or products without any special effort.”19  An identity solution for terrorism 
incident response must have this important capability.  The problems of radio 
interoperability are well documented. They are found among the lessons learned of every 
AAR and became a central focus of the 9/11 Commission Report.  The same gaps would 
be found if technology had been broadly applied to identity management for first 
responders. The implementation of identity management technology for first responders 
is in its infancy.  In its current state, it is the communication equivalent of smoke signals.  
This can be seen as a problem or an opportunity.  Unlike communications, there is not a 
proliferation of proprietary technology that has been implemented for identity 
management.  This presents an opportunity to promulgate a standards-based interoperable 
system.  Interoperability is a necessary element to enable authentication of responders 
from varied disciplines and levels of government that converge on incident scenes during 
the response to acts of terrorism. 
d. Data Storage / Retrieval and Promulgation Capability 
Data storage / retrieval and promulgation involves the ability to store or 
link to data in a manner that it can be brought forward for utilization in other processes. 
An identity management system for improved terrorism incident response must include 
the capability to store or link data in a manner that can be promulgated to, and utilized by 
 
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security SAFECOM Program, "Interoperability," 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/interoperability/default.htm. (accessed 14 July 2006). 
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incident commanders.  Data storage/retrieval and promulgation addresses two aspects 
deficient in previous response to incidents of terrorism.  The first deficit involves the 
matter of the training credential.  The first section of the two part definition of identity 
was introduced in Chapter I. Section A.  It also consists of a second part that includes 
“the set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable 
as a member of a group.”20
The group affiliation, or training credential in this case, is essential 
information for incident commanders to adequately deploy and coordinate appropriate 
assets to achieve incident objectives.  In Information, Technology, and Coordination: 
Lessons from the World Trade Center Response, the importance of information for 
deployment and coordination of responders is highlighted: “Effective deployment and 
coordination depend on many kinds of information from the roles and capabilities of 
response and support organizations to the identity of individual responders.”21  While the 
effective utilization of assets is a problem of incident management, providing the 
information concerning the characteristics, group affiliation, or training credential of 
assets is a function of identity management. 
The second deficiency in terrorism incident response that can be addressed 
through data storage/ retrieval and promulgation is accountability.  In the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Staff Statement No. 14, the 
following outlines the deficiency for accountability: “Once units arrived at the WTC they 
were not accounted for comprehensively and coordinated.”22 Providing this information 
is a function of a comprehensive identity management system.  Would the resources have 
been uncoordinated and unaccounted had an effective identity management system been 
in place?  A properly structured and effective identity management system would provide 
real-time usable information to incident commanders concerning the number, location, 
and qualifications of assets at his/her disposal.  Critical to incident commanders 
concerning personnel resources are the answers to questions such as: “Who is this?”, and 
 
20 American Heritage Dictionary, "Identity." 
21 Sharon S. Dawes et. al., Information, Technology, and Coordination: Lessons from the World Trade 
Center Response (Albany: University at Albany, SUNY, Center for Technology in Government, 2004), 9. 
22 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 14 
(Washington, D.C: n.p., n.d.), 8. 
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“What can they do for me?” An effective identity management system for incident 
response must provide incident commanders with the data to answer those critical 
questions. 
2. Criteria for Evaluation: Public Policy Considerations 
A purely theoretical solution meets the reality of implementation with the 
consideration of public policy concerns.  The utility of a solution lies in its ability to be 
translated into corrective government action.  Policy implementation is predicated on the 
political acceptability and cost of the program.  The incident response criteria described 
above delineate the utility of the solution relative to the identified problem.  The 
following public policy criteria evaluate the ability of the program to be brought to 
fruition.  Public policy concerns temper the utility to incident response with the capability 
of the program to be implemented.  There is little doubt that any homeland security 
problem presented can be solved provided it was fully funded and supported with all 
available resources.  The reality is that solutions must be cost effective and politically 
achievable.  Cost is a criterion for consideration in any potential public policy change.  
This addresses the essential question, “Is the cost of the cure greater than the problem?” 
The final element of the criteria for analysis is political acceptability.  More than 
acceptable, the policy must not be unacceptable.  In A Practical Guide for Policy 
Analysis political unacceptability is described as “a combination of two things: too much 
opposition (which may be wide or intense or both) and/or too little support (which may 
be insufficiently broad or insufficiently intense or both).”23  The ability to bring the 
proposed change to fruition is an essential element to the complete analysis of 
alternatives. 
E. SUMMARY 
The review of after-action reports of the response to major domestic incidents of 
terrorism reveals a significant gap in identity management for incident response.  Incident 
response to terrorism is a complex dynamic consisting of many factors.  Identity 
management is an important component of the response and if structured properly can 
provide not only authenticated identity leading to increased force protection, but 
 
23 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to Effective Problem 
Solving (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 32. 
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additional information to support scene safety and incident command and control 
decisions.  An effective identity management system that improves incident response 
must include methods for identity authentication, rapid check-in, interoperability, and 
capability for data storage/ retrieval and promulgation while considering overall costs and 
the political acceptability of the solution. The chapters that follow will detail the analysis 
of three policy options across the six identified criteria.  The analysis will reveal a 
preferred policy option and recommended course of action to close the identity 
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II. MAINTENANCE OF THE CURRENT DECENTRALIZED 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OPTION 1) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The current system of identity management for first responders is completely 
decentralized and results in extreme differentiation.  The process of issuing identity 
documents or badges to employees and volunteers is not often centralized at a municipal 
level.  It usually rests with each individual municipal agency.  There are also countless 
different issuance criteria that are utilized depending on response discipline, available 
technology, financial resources, and level of importance placed on identity credentials by 
the governmental entity.  Until recently, the same was true for the federal government 
and its many agencies and departments.  The federal government, under Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive – 12, has begun the process to consolidate identification 
into a single federal government identity credential.  This system will be further explored 
as a policy option in Chapter IV. 
Identity management systems vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These 
vast differences make it nearly impossible to trace every possibility for identity solutions 
that employed throughout the nation.  Due to the decentralized nature and extreme 
differentiation in how identity credentials are handled at the state and local levels, one 
community will be examined to illustrate and define the scope of the current 
decentralized system.  Frederick County, Maryland will be utilized to examine this 
system.  Frederick County was chosen for three reasons: first, it has an identity 
management problem that contains many issues relevant to this discussion.  Secondly, as 
there is not an extensive body of knowledge on the problem, Frederick County data was 
available and access was allowed to information and discussions in much greater detail 
than was available elsewhere.  Third, Frederick County has connections to the National 
Capital Region which allowed access to the identity project being undertaken that will be 
described in Chapter IV.  Frederick County identity management will be highlighted, and 
as available data allows, parallels will be drawn between it and other communities across 
America. 
16 
                                                
Although the response to incidents of terrorism will involve many levels of 
government and non-governmental organizations, the study of Frederick County as it 
relates to the current identity management system will focus on “first responders” as 
defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive – 8.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines emergency response 
providers as: “Federal, State, and local emergency public safety, law enforcement, 
emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and 
related personnel, agencies, and authorities.”24  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
– 8 incorporated the previous definition, but expanded on it to include “emergency 
management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support 
personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during 
prevention, response, and recovery operations.”25  The definition of first responder as 
applied to Frederick County government entities includes the Department of Fire/Rescue 
Services, Sheriff’s Office, Health Department, Department of Public Works, and one 
non-governmental organization, Frederick Memorial Hospital.   Each of these entities 
will be explored for identity management processes for the distribution of credentials.  
Identity authentication is only a portion of the issue, further complicating the matter of 
credentialing is the interdependencies of systems.  Local credentialing is often dependent 
on state licensure requirements, particularly in the areas of medicine, emergency medical 
services, and law enforcement.  These interrelationships and other issues will be explored 
and evaluated through the examination of identity credentialing for “first responders” in 
Frederick County, MD. 
B. FIRST RESPONDER IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN FREDERICK 
COUNTY, MD 
1. Law Enforcement - Frederick County Sheriff’s Office 
Identity credentialing for law enforcement officers in Frederick County and across 
the State of Maryland is a cooperative function requiring both state and local action.  The 
certification of police officers is regulated by the Maryland Police and Corrections 
Training Commission (MPCTC).  Under the authority of Section 3-208 (a) of the 
 
24 Homeland Security Act. U.S. Code Annotated, Vol. 6, Sec. 101(2002). 
25 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, December 2003), 1. 
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Maryland Public Safety Article the MPCTC regulates the training, background 
investigation, and criminal history standards for police officer certification.  In the 
process of certifying a police officer, the responsibility of positively establishing identity 
rests with the local employing agency.  The application does not capture verifiable 
biometric identifiers such as a photograph or fingerprints. Agency verified identity 
information (Driver’s License, Birth Certificate, etc.) is captured on the application for 
certification and forwarded to MPCTC for review and issuance of a certification 
document. 
The certification document consists only of a paper card with a certificate 
number, control number, and expiration date.  The document does not contain security 
features, or biometric identifiers.  The control and certificate numbers are not verifiable, 
other than by phone call during normal business hours.  The telephone verification does 
not include biometric or other identifiers, only the status of the card number. 
The Sheriff’s Office Records Section produces identification for Frederick 
County Deputies.  The identification consists of a digital picture on an adhesive plastic 
card that is attached on a contactless building access card.  The identification does not 
contain any security features other than a tracking number for the building access card.  If 
lost or stolen the card can be electronically revoked preventing building access.  The 
identity token contains no verifiable information other than the name and employee 
identification number of the deputy.  This information can only be verified by phone call 
to the agency. 
The law enforcement example provided through the Frederick County Sheriff’s 
Office and its relationship to the State of Maryland is similar to many other communities 
in the United States.  Most importantly, Maryland, along with 42 other U.S. States, views 
police officer certification as a license that requires renewal.  It can also be suspended or 
revoked.26  In other states, such as Rhode Island, the State sets the minimum standards 
for suitability and training of entry-level personnel who earn a certificate of completion 
that cannot be revoked.  The system relies upon local employing entities to determine 
whether an individual is suitable for employment once entry-level requirements are met.  
 
26 Roger L. Goldman and Steven Puro, "Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy 
for Police Officer Misconduct?," St. Louis University Law Journal 45, no. 541 (Spring 2001). 
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This is an important difference that indicates a higher level of ‘trust’ in the credential of 
police officers with continuing licensing requirements.  Another important element is the 
absence of nationally recognized and accepted training standards.  This further 
complicates the matter of marrying identity and training levels into a credential.  
Organizations such as the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA) and The International Association of Director’s of Law Enforcement Standards 
and Training (IADLEST) provide model-based standards for law enforcement policy and 
administration, however, fall short of prescribing minimum competencies for law 
enforcement officers. 
2. Fire Fighting / Emergency Medical Services - Frederick County 
Division of Fire/ Rescue Services (DFRS) 
Identity credentialing for Fire/EMS personnel in Frederick County, MD is 
differentiated based on position and paid or volunteer status.  DFRS is staffed by only 
100 career professional firefighters.  The main force, totaling nearly 1300, is made-up of 
volunteers from independent incorporated volunteer fire companies.  The process of 
identity credentialing is vastly different for professionals and volunteers, as well as 
differentiated for firefighters and personnel providing emergency medical services. 
a. Firefighting Personnel 
DFRS firefighting professional staff are subjected to background 
investigations and fingerprint checks prior to employment.  The investigations and checks 
are completed through the Office of the State Fire Marshal.  Once completed, DFRS Fire 
employees are trained to National Fire Protection Association firefighter II standard 
before station assignment.27   Differing from law enforcement, there are options for local 
jurisdictions in the adoption of training standards.  The State of Maryland regulates by 
law the standards for those personnel who serve as trainers, but does not prescribe 
content training standards for other personnel.  This lack of an enforceable standard 
results in differences in training and requirements from county to county within the State 
of Maryland.  There are other voluntary compliance options for standardized training 
through the Maryland Fire Service Professional Qualification Board (MFSPQB). The 
MFSPQB has prescribed a standardized training curriculum, but its use is voluntary and 
 
27 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1000: Standards for Fire Service Professional 
Qualifications Accreditation and Certification Systems (Quincy, MA: NFPA, 2006). 
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is utilized by only a few agencies across the state.  There are also national training 
standards offered by the aforementioned Nation Fire Protection Association with 
additional standardized certification also available through the National Board on Fire 
Service Professional Qualifications. 
As independent corporations, the volunteer fire companies are offered the 
opportunity to have the Office of the State Fire Marshal perform background 
investigations on prospective members.  Very few companies take advantage of this 
service and accept members without the available checks. As Maryland law does not 
govern it, the volunteer company determines the requirements and training level.  Within 
Frederick County there is a mix of training levels because of the lack of enforceable state 
standards. 
Both volunteer and professional firefighters are issued plastic identity 
credential cards.  These simple cards contain no security features.  The card consists of a 
digital picture, name of the employee, job function, and name of the organization.  These 
cards are also unverifiable other than by phone call to employing agency or volunteer fire 
company.  They do not contain tracking numbers or other features to maintain 
accountability. 
b. Emergency Medical Services Personnel 
The DFRS employees and volunteers of the independent corporations who 
deliver pre-hospital emergency medical services (EMS) are governed by prescribed 
Maryland State standards.  Maryland Annotated Code Section 13-509 provides the 
Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) with the 
authority to regulate and provide training standards for personnel involved in pre-hospital 
medical treatment.  MIEMSS has adopted regulations consistent with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) standard curriculum for emergency medical services providers. 
MIEMSS certification requires specific training and testing to achieve and 
maintain certification.  MIEMSS issues a plastic certification card that contains no 
verifiable biometric information.  The card contains a bar-code and information regarding 
name and location, level of certification, expiration date, and a certification identification 
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number that could be verified by MIEMSS during business hours.  The State of 
Maryland, along with 42 other U.S. States, requires Emergency Medical Technicians to 
meet and maintain the certification standards of the National Registry for Emergency 
Medical Technicians (NREMT).28  Unique to the credentialing mechanisms studied thus 
far, the NREMT maintains an on-line database that may be queried by name and state 
that provides the current status and level of certification for all registered personnel. 
3. Public Health - Frederick County Health Department 
Similar to law enforcement, Frederick County Public Health Officials are issued 
identity credentials through a cooperative state and local process.  There is an additional 
issue as many of the personnel assigned to the Frederick County Health Department are 
actually employees of the State of Maryland that has a differentiated process.  The nurses 
and physicians employed by either the State or local government are subject to State of 
Maryland certification requirements for health professionals. 
In order practice as a physician or nurse in Maryland, certain qualifications are 
required to receive and maintain professional licensure.  The Maryland Board of 
Physicians and the Maryland Board of Nursing under the Maryland State Department of 
Heath and Mental Hygiene determine qualifications.  The powers of the boards are 
codified in the Code of Maryland Regulations Title 10 (Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene) Subtitle 29 (Board of Nursing) and Subtitle 32 (Board of Physicians).  These 
sections establish the regulatory authority of the Maryland Board of Physicians and 
Maryland Board of Nursing for the purposes of licensing professionals.  These boards 
regulate the required initial and continuing education requirements for professional 
licensure in Maryland.  The boards also maintain the authority to suspend or revoke 
professional credentials for malfeasance and/or failure to meet continuing re-certification 
requirements. 
In order to receive a professional license, the board mandates education and 
testing requirements.  If the requirements are met, a paper credential containing name, 
certificate type, certificate number, and expiration date is issued.  The paper document 
contains no security features or biometric information.  Both the Board of Physicians and 
 
28 National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians, "About EMS," 
http://www.nremt.org/about/ems_learn.asp/ (accessed 9 April 2006). 
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Board of Nursing maintain searchable on-line databases.  This allows for internet 
confirmation of license status.  The database is searchable by name or certificate number 
anytime.  Due to the open nature of the search function no identifying information other 
than name, practice address, and status are shown as search results. 
The physicians and nurses employed by the Frederick County Health Department 
are required to maintain professional certification.  Both state and county employees are 
issued Frederick County identification cards.  These are simple plastic cards that contain 
basic information, photo, and no security features or accountability process.  The 
employment process for Frederick County personnel does not include background checks 
beyond the verification of professional license and routine pre-employment practices.  In 
contrast, employees of the State of Maryland are subject to additional fingerprint and 
criminal background checks before employment.  The State employees are then issued an 
additional identity credential that contains a photo and information concerning job 
function, and certification. 
A recent program developed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services is seeking to provide personnel definitions and credentialing in healthcare 
nationwide.  The Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals (ESAR-VHP) Program seeks to “develop a system that allows for the 
advance registration and credentialing of clinicians needed to augment a hospital or other 
medical facility to meet increased patient/victim care and increased surge capacity 
needs.”29  The desired outcome of the program is “...all States will have an ESAR-VHP 
System developed in coordination with HRSA’s ESAR-VHP program, allowing for a 
national system of mutual assistance of health volunteers within a State’s public health 
structures and hospital systems.”30  The ESAR-VHP definitions provide leveled 
emergency credentialing standards for physicians, registered nurses, marriage and family 




29 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, 
Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals Program: Interim 
Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards and Definitions (Washington, D.C.: HRSA, 2005), 3. 
30 Ibid, 17. 
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social workers, psychologists, mental health counselors, and behavioral health 
professionals.  The program is advancing with a target date of December 2006 for state 
implementation. 
4. Clinical Care - Frederick Memorial Hospital 
Clinical care and public health realms are governed by the same overarching 
structure. The clinical care staff of Frederick Memorial Hospital are governed by the 
same State of Maryland regulations and professional standards boards as the public health 
professionals.  The physicians and nurses employed by Frederick Memorial Hospital are 
subject to additional checks by the hospital before privileges are granted.  After hiring, 
personnel are provided with plastic access badges that contain digital photograph, job 
assignment and contain magnetic stripe technology that is integrated with hospital access 
control systems.  The plastic badges issued to personnel serve to allow access to 
restricted areas of the hospital through magnetic stripe technology that allows access 
based on entry requirements.  As the ESAR VHP program advances in Maryland, clinical 
care staff that choose to volunteer can register through the program to have established 
emergency credentials. 
5. Public Works - Frederick County Division of Public Works 
The Frederick County Division of Public Works has the most diversified 
workforce of the County Agencies.  Public Works operations include a wide spectrum of 
employees from professional engineers to highway operations equipment operators.  
Many of the positions require professional licensure under the Code of Maryland 
Regulations Title 9 Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation.  For example, many 
employees of the Division of Public Works require licensure from several boards under 
this title including the Board of Architects, Board of Master Electricians, Board of 
Examining Engineers, and Board of Plumbing.  Although the professional positions are 
regulated by board requirements, many of the other positions are not governed by 
overarching standards, outside of commercial driver’s license requirements, including 
highway operations and heavy equipment operators, who receive only on the job training. 
Both professional and operations staff are issued plastic identity cards after standard pre-
employment screening that does not include fingerprint or background investigations.  
The card contains a picture, name, job title, and no inherent security features. 
The Public Works credentialing situation in Frederick County is similar to other 
areas of the country. In the January, 2005 edition of the American Public Works 
Association Magazine, Reporter, author Larry Lux describes the problem for public 
works nationally. 
Perhaps our weakest area is in the qualifications and certifications of our 
personnel. While our emergency personnel are generally expertly prepared 
and well trained for their day-to-day jobs, unlike our colleagues in other 
disciplines… we do not have a peer review process that issues credentials 
certifying the competencies and training of public works professionals. 31 
Public Works as a discipline presents the greatest challenge. Oversight and standards for 
other disciplines vary, but they are assisted by existing national standards, and/or state 
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31 Larry Lux, "The impact of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on the public works 
community," American Public Works Association Reporter Online, (January 2005), 
http://www.apwa.net/Publications/Reporter/ReporterOnline/index.asp?DISPLAY=ISSUE&ISSUE_DATE




The previous sections detail the current status of first responder identity as it 
relates to the disciplines of law enforcement, firefighting, emergency medical services, 
public health, clinical care, and public works. The current system will be evaluated 
utilizing the criteria developed in Chapter I Part C Section 2 of this thesis which include 
identity authentication, rapid in-processing, interoperability, data storage/ promulgation 
capability, cost, and political acceptability.  The criteria were identified as the elements 
necessary in a credential for the successful response to an incident of terrorism. 
The current system, as identified through the example of Frederick County, MD, 
provides no ability for identity authentication.  The heart of identity authentication is trust 
model identified previously as the ability to “trust, but verify”.  The documents that 
would be presented in the response to an incident of terrorism in Frederick County and 
most of America are unverifiable, lack security features, and lack an issuance process that 
develops trust.  The process of identification issuance at the Frederick County Sheriff’s 
Office is the closest to providing a trusted identity, as the extensive nature of the 
background investigation and hiring process provides a level of certainty as to the 
identity of the individual.  The trust developed in a sound process is then diminished 
through the issuance of an easily counterfeited unverifiable paper identity token.  The 
current first responder identity credentials in Frederick County do not provide methods 
for the authentication of identity. 
The evaluative criteria rapid in-processing is also deficient in the current identity 
system for first responders.  In our example community, the credentials issued to 
Frederick County government personnel do not allow for rapid in-processing in the event 
of an incident.  In addition to no security features, the identity tokens also do not contain 
any exploitable technology features (bar-code, magnetic strip, etc.) that would enhance in 
processing capability.  If the technology were present, there is currently no available 
resource to manage on-scene identity or equipment to exploit the technology. The current 
status would require complete in-processing and issuance of an incident specific identity.  
The current state of first responder identity does not allow for rapid in-processing. 
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The evaluative criteria for interoperability and data storage/promulgation 
capabilities are related as they both require a technological solution. As the credentials 
issued in Frederick County and many other jurisdictions across the nation do not contain 
exploitable technological features, they lack the capability for interoperability and data 
storage/ promulgation.  In addition, credentials issued are in most cases created and 
issued without jurisdictional system design.  Each of the agencies in Frederick County 
utilizes different tokens and issuance processes.  There is no common standard or as 
previously described, exploitable technology feature.  The identity tokens are not 
interoperable nor do they have the capability to store or transfer data. 
The evaluative criteria cost is what continues to keep the current decentralized 
identity system as an attractive option.  Cost data was not available for each of the 
agencies or Frederick County as a whole; however, the low cost of unverifiable no-tech 
identity cards is what drives their proliferation.  These cards cost only a few cents each, 
and they provide the community a solution equal to their perceived level of risk.  In most 
cases, the higher the perceived risk or need for security in a community, the better 
technology the community will employ.  The current identity system meets the day to day 
needs of most organizations, but will fail under stress. 
Most communities are not willing to make the significant investment required to 
overhaul identity management systems to provide the benefits to low probability events 
such as incidents of terrorism.  The compelling argument for utilizing technologically 
advanced systems is the integration of e-government initiatives. E-government is defined 
by the Center for Technology in Government Report Making a Case for Local E-
Government as “the use of information technology to support government operations, 
engage citizens, and provide government services.”32  Examples of the benefits of e-
government initiatives cited by the report include increasing efficiency by streamlining 





32 Meghan Cook et al., Making a Case for Local E-Government (Albany: SUNY University at Albany, 
Center for Technology in Government, 2002), 3. 
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service, keeping up with citizen demands and expectations, and promoting what local 
governments do well. 33  The increased investment in identity related technology must 
translate into public value. 
The current system creates little in the way of public value as it does not provide 
benefits to other government processes or address essential functions in the response to 
terrorism.  In turn, this system costs little, justifying its existence.  Viable alternatives 
must create public value by providing benefits and cost savings to other government 
ventures.  The low cost of the current system makes it attractive as a continuing option.  
The issue of cost is also intertwined with political acceptability as it relates to the 
development of minimum basic competencies that form the training aspect of a 
credential. 
The current decentralized system is politically acceptable to state and municipal 
governments as it has developed under the Constitutional principle of federalism, and 
until recently absent the threat of terrorism.  The Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”34  The current decentralized identity system is aligned with the federal system of 
dividing power between levels of government embodied in the United States 
Constitution.  The power to prescribe the qualifications and training for professions are 
within the regulatory ‘police powers’ of the State.  Police powers are described in the 
Supreme Court Case U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.: “It cannot be denied that the power of the 
state to protect the lives, health and property of its citizens and to preserve good order 
and the public morals, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its 
dominion, is a power originally and always belonging to the state, not surrendered to the 
general [federal] Government, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the United 
States, and essentially exclusive.”35  The power to prescribe general qualification 
definitions and methods for the issuance of identity documents are inherent to the duties 
reserved to the States by the United States Constitution.  The current system is politically 
 
33 Cook et al., Making a Case for Local E-Government, 4-5. 
34 United States Const., Amend. X. 
35 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (S.Ct. 294 1895). 
acceptable as it is consistent with current practices and authorities.  Political acceptability 
is not necessarily a positive characteristic as it relates to the improvement of identity 
management for terrorism incident response.  It is, however, a necessary element to 
consider in the implementation of proposed solutions.  The legalities and relationship 
between the powers of the state and federal governments established by the United States 
Constitution and relevant case law are essential considerations in implementation 
strategies.   The current system has developed under Constitutional delegated authorities 
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Table 2. Evaluation Matrix: Decentralized Identity Management System 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The current decentralized identity management system for first responders is 
fragmented at best.  The snapshot of one community showed the disparity in the 
methodology for the issuance of identity credentials across disciplines and the 
complexities governing the regulation of professional and training credentials.  The 
current system is a puzzle that does not develop trust and returns little to the public.  
Trust in an identity system is predicated on marrying strong product and process.  As 
demonstrated in the Frederick County example, there is disparity in process and product 
within just one jurisdiction.  When multiplying that effect across the American federal 
system, the result is the possibility of thousands of processes and products resulting in a 
critical identity trust gap.  The current State of identity management provides almost no 
larger benefit to the response to incidents of terrorism.  The National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) identifies that “credentialing involves providing 
documentation that can authenticate and verify the certification and identity of designated 
27 
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incident managers and emergency responders.”36  The current identity system does not 
provide the mechanism to credential across disciplines for improved terrorism incident 
response. 
Arguably, as with many areas of government, the current system was not designed 
for the eventuality of terrorism.  When considered absent of the threat of terrorism the 
system also does not provide public value equal to its potential benefit.  It is obvious the 
current credentialing system was developed with no overarching design.  The regulation 
among the disparate disciplines have come together under the moniker of first 
responders, exposing stark differences and definitional problems as it relates to processes 
for secure identity and the need for basic training competencies.  A shift in the paradigm 
for first responder credentialing is essential for improved terrorism incident response. 
As identified through the evaluation of the identified criteria, the current system 
provides no inherent factors that support improved response to incidents of terrorism.  
The current identity system satisfies traditional concerns over cost and acceptability to 
the political system; however, it provides little public value or benefit to the overall 
delivery of government services.  The challenge in identity management for improved 
terrorism incident response is to create a framework that leverages existing investments 
to increase public value.  An improved identity management system that provides 
benefits, not only to terrorism response, but improves processes and results in greater 
efficiency in the delivery of public services is a necessary.  The current system as 
outlined is a hindrance to the delivery of timely assistance in the event of a catastrophe 
that requires a large multi-jurisdictional government response. 
 
 
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2004), 46. 
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III. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAMS FOR TERRORISM 
INCIDENT RESPONSE (OPTION 2) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The concept of identity management teams for incident response is not novel.  A 
version of this solution has been implemented at every major incident of terrorism out of 
necessity.  The need to control access and positively identify personnel on terrorism 
incident scenes was recognized with our first domestic attack on the World Trade Center 
in 1993.  The impetus in 1993 was the need to control access to the crime scene.37  The 
additional threat of secondary attack as described in Chapter I of this thesis shows 
increased urgency for effective incident scene control and credentialing.  The failings of 
identity credentialing during the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing, 
and the 2001 responses to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were pervasive and 
discussed in Chapter I Section 1.  The Arlington County and Oklahoma City After-Action 
Reports are instructive, however, as the failings of identity management early in the 
incident were tempered with later success.  The systems that were instituted over the 
course of the incidents, through trial and error, provide best practices and a concept of 
operations at the heart of what should comprise an on-scene identity management team 
for terrorism incident response. 
As established through the analysis of historical responses to incidents of 
terrorism conducted in Chapter I, identity management is a major deficiency for terrorism 
incident response.  Despite this deficiency, there is currently not a defined response asset 
under the FEMA National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative to address 
this important function.  The National Mutual Aid Resource Management Initiative 
“supports the National Incident Management System by establishing a comprehensive, 
integrated, national mutual aid and resource management system that provides the basis 
to type, order, and track all (Federal, State, and local) response assets.”38  The resource 
definitions are typed so the level of capability of resources can be readily determined 
 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration, The World Trade 
Center Bombing: Report and Analysis (Emmitsburg, MD: USFA, 1993), 135. 
38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Typed Resource 
Definitions: Law Enforcement and Security Resources (Washington, D.C.: FEMA, 2005), 2. 
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before an asset is requested.  The problem is that there is no resource definition that 
performs the function of identity management for incident response.  Currently, if an 
incident commander needed assistance in managing access to the scene through a 
credentialing system, there are no typed assets to order through mutual aid or other 
process to perform this function, leaving a glaring capability gap. 
The Frederick County Sheriff’s Office, in recognition of the law enforcement 
responsibility for force protection, scene control, and crime scene protection in the event 
of a terrorist incident, developed a proposal to the State of Maryland for a demonstration 
project to overcome the identity deficiencies of first response agencies in Frederick 
County described in detail in Chapter II.  The proposal seeks the development of an 
operational typed response resource to perform identity management functions on the 
scene of a terrorist incident.  The intent of this chapter is twofold: first, to explain the 
rationale for the resource definition as developed for the proposed demonstration project 
and second, to evaluate the product across the defined response and public policy criteria 
to determine its suitability to close the identity management capability gap for terrorism 
incident response. 
B. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM CASE STUDIES 
The explanation of the rationale begins with the examination of the 1995 
Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing and the 9/11/01 Response to the 
Pentagon to clarify the development of the resource definition and typing for the 
proposed identity management response resource. These incidents and after-action 
reports provide significant detail regarding the development of ad-hoc identity 
management capabilities as the incidents unfolded.  Parallels will be drawn utilizing other 
published documents that highlight, but do not provide enough significant detail for case 
study.  The review of these incidents reveals a baseline structure for a typed identity 
management resource.  The resource definition as developed by the Frederick County 
Sheriff’s Office will be analyzed across the identified criteria for public policy 
considerations and improved terrorism incident response as it relates to closing the 




                                                
1. 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building Bombing 
In the response to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing incident many lessons were 
learned concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, importance of site 
access control, and the need for dedicated identity management resources.  The 
Oklahoma City incident provides the background for the first large-scale terrorist incident 
that required a robust capability for identity management and scene control.  Through 
trial and error, and utilizing only available resources, an ad-hoc identity management 
capability was developed and sustained that allowed for the issuance of over 28,000 
identity credentials over the course of the incident. 
The initial failure of identity management at the incident scene was the lack of 
any pre-planned credentialing option.  This lesson learned is captured in the 
recommendations of the After-Action Report.  Although the capability gap is clearly 
identified in the report, eleven years later there still remains no guidance, or nationally 
defined resource to perform this critical function.  This subsection seeks to close the gap 
first exposed in the Oklahoma City response by defining a response asset for this critical 
function. 
The development of on-scene identity credentialing first requires the 
establishment of a perimeter.  In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, establishing a 
controlled perimeter around the incident site occurred within two hours of the blast.39  
Once the perimeter was established the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) 
utilized its only available asset to issue identification by moving its Permit and 
Identification Section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges.  The Permit 
and Identification Section was not a deployable asset; however, it was the only available 
option for credentialing. Once established, the operations of the Permits and 
Identification Section lasted only a few hours as identity supplies were quickly 
exhausted.40
The OCPD continued to issue alternative forms of identification: “different 
colored passes were issued for each day after April 20th to discourage people from 
 
39 City of Oklahoma City, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing April 19, 1995: Final Report, 
369. 
40 Ibid, 39. 
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returning to the site when they had no current assignment.”41  Due to rain and lighting 
conditions, the location of the identity station changed three times.  When agents from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrived, they also began issuing identification, 
causing confusion for those manning the perimeter.  FBI and OCPD finally consolidated 
their operations and issued one form of identification, operating from a vacant warehouse 
building.  This is informative for the concept of operation for the employment of an 
identity management resource, as it must be integrated and maintain a permanent location 
throughout the incident. 
In Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned for Other Communities, 
it is reported that early in the response “the ID process was a major issue due to lack of 
controls and systems in place. No one had been designated to issue ID's and the system 
was hit and miss.”42  This is instructive in defining an identity asset as it must include 
controls and systems, and be specifically designated to perform the function with a direct 
link to on-scene unified command.  
The After-Action Report also details the process utilized for credentialing 
volunteers and rescue workers. 
The process was as follows: volunteers appeared at the Permits and ID 
location and filled out a permit form with their name, agency, and 
destination.  This permit form was submitted along with a photo ID.  The 
Investigator would inquire as to reasons for accessing the scene.  The 
permit would be approved or denied based on the reason and destination.  
The Investigator entered the information into a logbook, signed the permit, 
and sent the volunteer to the FBI photo section for their photo ID.  If there 
were questions about the admittance of a person, the FBI made the final 
determination.43
The excerpt from the After-Action Report gives detail to the process for issuing on-scene 
identity credential documents.  It included examination of identity documents, affiliation 
and destination, collection of a photograph, and recordation of the issued document.  
 
41 City of Oklahoma City, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing April 19, 1995: Final Report, 
C-217. 
42 Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City- Seven 
Years Later: Lessons Learned for Other Communities, 11. 
43 City of Oklahoma City, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing April 19, 1995: Final Report, 
C-217. 
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These elements form the basis of a minimum inspection necessary for entrance to a 
terrorism incident scene.  Another essential element of the identity management function 
is communications equipment.  Credentialing staff utilized “a cellular phone and a police 
radio….when trying to check on whether a volunteer should gain access to the scene.”44  
Communications equipment and the aforementioned direct contact with on-scene incident 
command are essential elements in a response asset for identity management. 
The process was not without criticism.  The After-Action Report details that, 
“Due to the number of persons requesting entry, the limited resources for processing 
permits, and lack of guidelines, this process generated complaints. Complaints came from 
rescue workers and volunteers about the length of time to obtain a permit and the 
restrictions on the permit.”45  The identity process undertaken during the Murrah Federal 
building bomb response was completed by hand, not utilizing computerized processes.  
The After Action report advises “The entire process would probably have gone more 
smoothly had investigators been able to utilize lap top computers to enter the necessary 
data on the volunteers.”46  The defined response resource must include computerized 
processes that allow data and biometric information to be quickly captured and stored to 
allow access at later times to facilitate processing for re-entry into the scene. 
The Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing response provides baseline 
information on the development of a defined resource to improve identity management 
for terrorism incident response.  Based on the lessons learned from the response, seven 
elements for the concept of operations and necessary equipment for an identity 
management asset for incident response are revealed.  The elements related to the concept 
of operations of a defined resource include a pre-planned solution, an established 
perimeter, a defined location for distribution, systems and controls including a defined 
issuance processes and tracking of issued credentials.  The lessons learned also revealed 
necessary equipment and identity supplies including mechanisms to receive 
replenishment, communications equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and database 
 





                                                
access), computer equipment for identity document production (digital cameras, 
computers, identification printers).  The lessons learned and ad hoc developments during 
the response to the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing form the basis of a 
defined resource for identity management for incident response. 
2. 9/11/01 Pentagon Response 
The response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on 9/11/01 also revealed 
many lessons learned concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, 
importance of site access control, and the need for dedicated identity management 
resources.  The Pentagon attack provides additional background for large-scale terrorist 
incident response that required a robust capability for identity management and scene 
control.  As with the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal building bombing, credentialing at 
the Pentagon also developed through trial and error, utilizing available resources.  The 
Pentagon response also tested the boundaries of a limited credentialing solution 
developed by the Arlington County Police Department in the wake of the identity failures 
in the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal building response.  The development of the 
credentialing function at the Pentagon incident site is also instructive as its evolution 
informs the development of a resource definition for an identity management team for 
improved terrorism incident response. 
Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 
Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an identification system for incident 
scene security and accountability.  The system consisted of 2,000 red, yellow, blue, and 
green colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene.  In the tremendous 
public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington County deployed 
its identity management system two days into the response. Once the system was utilized, 
the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.47  This failure is instructive in that 
it took two days to implement an access control system and that identity supplies must be 




47 Titan Systems Corporation, Arlington County: After Action Report on the Response to the 
September 11 Terrorist Attack at the Pentagon, C-23. 
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enhances the argument for a defined deployable identity management resource staffed by 
trained personnel that possess the appropriate equipment and supplies is essential for 
improved terrorism incident response. 
On the third day of the response, the Defense Protective Service (DPS), similar to 
the tactic employed by Oklahoma City Police in 1995, utilized its available badging 
equipment to produce identity credentials.  The DPS system is described in the After-
Action Report as “burdensome”48 and “inadequate for a task of this magnitude.”49  In 
addition it is described that the badging process “took too long, delaying shift changes 
inordinately.”50  The AAR also describes “because of the limited computers to create 
badges and lack of a single database, processing added an additional burden to crew 
relief.”51 This is instructive in that a defined identity management resource must have 
adequate computer stations and utilize a single database.  This also further evidences the 
need for a defined as asset as ad-hoc solutions have wasted valuable time as lessons are 
learned in identity management for incident response time and again at the cost of safety, 
force protection, and lost on-scene work hours. 
At the request of DPS and the FBI, the identity system was bolstered by the 
addition of United States Secret Service (USSS) identity assets.  The AAR describes that 
the USSS trained members of the Army Band to operate its five portable badge-making 
workstations.52  After the incorporation of the USSS equipment the system was described 
as “effective.”53  The addition of more appropriate equipment and trained personnel 
resulted in system that was more effective.  This is instructive in the development of a 
defined resource as the number of workstations must permit sufficient throughput not to 
hamper on-scene operations. 
The 9/11/01 Pentagon response provides further validation to the baseline 
information provided by the study of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal building  
48 Titan Systems Corporation, Arlington County: After Action Report on the Response to the 
September 11 Terrorist Attack at the Pentagon, A-69. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., C-58. 
51 Ibid., A-69. 
52 Ibid., C-23. 
53 Ibid. 
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bombing for the development of a defined resource to improve identity management for 
terrorism incident response.  In addition to the lessons learned from the response to 
Oklahoma City incident, the Pentagon response provides additional information for the 
construction of a defined identity management resource.  Lessons learned indicate the 
need for adequate supplies, sufficient workstations to provide reasonable throughput, and 
the need for a central database.  These additional factors when combined with the 
elements revealed in the response to the Oklahoma City incident develop the baseline of a 
defined resource for identity management functions on incident scenes. 
C. IDENTITIY MANAGEMENT TEAM: TYPED RESOURCE 
The lessons learned and basic necessary elements of an identity management team 
were revealed through examination of the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal building 
bombing and the 9/11/01 response to the Pentagon.  The elements related to the concept 
of operations of a defined asset include a pre-planned solution, an established perimeter, 
defined distribution location, a direct link to on-scene incident command, systems and 
controls including a consistent issuance processes and tracking of issued credentials.  The 
lessons learned also revealed necessary equipment, including: a significant amount of 
identity supplies and mechanisms to acquire additional materials, communications 
equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and database access), computer equipment 
sufficient for significant throughput for identity document production (digital cameras, 
computers, identification printers), and a single centralized database.  Utilizing these 
lessons learned and basic elements, the following resource definition was developed.  The 
Identity Management Team (IDMT) resource as defined below was developed by the 
Frederick County Sheriff’s Office and considered by the State of Maryland for the 







RESOURCE: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM (IDMT) 




TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV OTHER
Equipment Computer 
Equipment 
5 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(5 Computers, 5 Digital 
Cameras, 5 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 
3 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(3 Computers, 3 Digital 
Cameras, 3 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 






radios, extra batteries, 





radios, extra batteries, 
battery charger, cellular 
phones) 




Access, external LE 
database access 
Wireless Internet 
Access, external LE 
database access 
   
Equipment Software Database accessible by 
Incident Command 
Database accessible by 
Incident Command 












Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
5,000 interoperable 
Identity Tokens 
Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
   
Equipment Generator Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
   
Personnel Training Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment and 
perform identity 
functions 
Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment 
and perform identity 
functions 
   




1 Supervisor or OIC 
4 Officers 
   
Vehicles  Integrated in mobile 
asset or deployable to a 
fixed location 
Integrated in Mobile 
Asset / or deployable to 
fixed location 
   
COMMENTS: Type I – A predesignated team consisting of 1 OIC, 1 Supervisor and 6 Officers in an integrated mobile response 
asset. The team has the ability to manage identity management functions for large-scale incidents. The team 
engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
Type II – A predesignated team consisting of 1 Supervisor or OIC and 4 Officers in an integrated or deployable to 
a fixed location.  The team has the ability to manage identity functions for small to mid-sized events. Team 
engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
Table 3. Identity Management Team Resource Definition 
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The function of the IDMT is to provide identity authentication and accountability 
support to incident command through the implementation of a comprehensive on-scene 
credentialing system.  The IDMT function is dependent upon the establishment of a 
strong perimeter as evidenced by the analysis of the Oklahoma City and Pentagon 
Incidents.  The concept of operations also must include deferment of un-requested assets 
to a secondary staging area.  The FEMA report Responding to Incidents of National 
Consequence: Recommendations for America’s Fire and Emergency Services Based on 
The Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents recommends “There 
should be a separate marshalling area at the incident base for unrequested/ unverified 
resources.  This ‘corral’ concept was used in Oklahoma City.  For added security, law 
enforcement should manage the perimeter of these areas.”54 This recommendation is 
incorporated into the IDMT concept of operations outlined in Figure 1. 
The study of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing and the 
Pentagon attack also revealed the need for a consistent system of identity issuance.  The 
Oklahoma City AAR detailed the process that was utilized to issue credentials, however, 
the Pentagon AAR does not provide sufficient detail that describes the mechanisms of the 
issuance process.  The paper based system that was developed out of necessity and 
availability of materials can be greatly enhanced with the advent of readily available 
technologies that can populate data into software from existing identity credentials, such 
as readers for 2D barcodes or magnetic stripes that have been incorporated into many 
state drivers’ licenses.  In addition, the necessity to maintain connectivity to law 
enforcement and other databases allows for further inspection of identity as outlined in 
the resource definition (Table 3).  This allows for verification of identity through other 
sources should inspection and electronic implementation of available credentials require 
addition investigation. 
Utilizing exploitable features of existing identity credentials coupled with agency 
issued credentials can greatly enhance the ability to examine documents and rapidly 
populate data into a database for a smooth and rapid process for credential issuance.  In 
 
54 Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration, Responding to 
Incidents to National Consequence: Recommendations for America's Fire and Emergency Services Based 
on the Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents (Washington, D.C.: FEMA, 2004), 50. 
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some jurisdictions it may also be possible to pre-populate the database with responder 
information/ biometrics that can be utilized in emergency response situations requiring 
tight scene controls.  Individual jurisdictions or regions may choose to issue responder 
credentials with exploitable technology that can further improve the on-scene 
credentialing process. 
The Department of Defense program Defense Cross Credentialing Identification 
System (DCCIS) has developed a web-base option for identity verification for non-
government personnel requiring access to government resources.55  The Federation for 
Identity and Cross-Credentialing Systems (FiXS) maintains the ability to authenticate 
identity through the maintenance of a system that allows companies to keep their 
employee data in their own system that is only accessed when a credential is presented 
for authentication.  The structure of the system alleviates privacy concerns as data is not 
maintained in a single accessible database.  This model is not a strong option for 
applicability to identity for incident response as communications have traditionally failed 
in response to incidents of terrorism.  The dependence on a web based system would 
require assurances of continued access through the evolution of an event.  This is not a 
dependable option based on previous response experience. 
The implementation of an interoperable or technology based solution at the local 
or State level will continue to require a dedicated resource to manage identity.  A 
technological solution does not eliminate the need for the function to be managed and 
maintained on-scene.  In addition, not all responders will be issued the same credential, 
particularly across private-sector agencies that are critical to the success of response and 
recovery operations.  Those not issued credentials pre-event will require the on-scene 
identity issuance capability of a defined Identity Management Team. 
 
55 Federation for Identity and Cross Credentialing Systems, "Welcome to FiXS," http://www.fixs.org/ 
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Figure 1.   Identity Management Team Concept of Operations 
 
D. EVALUATION 
The Identity Management Team (IDMT) resource as defined above incorporates 
the identity management lessons learned and best practices of the response to the 1995 
Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing and the 2001 response to the Pentagon 
attack.  The IDMT as a defined resource will be evaluated utilizing the developed criteria.  
The incident response criteria as developed in Chapter I include identity authentication, 
rapid in-processing, interoperability, and data storage/ promulgation.  The additional 
public policy criteria include cost and political acceptability.  The Identity Management 
Team as defined at the type one level will be evaluated utilizing the criteria. 
40 
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The first evaluative criterion is identity authentication.  The Identity Management 
Team (IDMT) does not address the endemic first responder credentialing problem of 
identity authentication, nor does it develop a pre-event system-wide trust model.  The 
resource definition does provide the mechanism to institute an on-scene trust model that 
can authenticate identity utilizing disparate credentials, evidenced by the examination of 
Frederick County, MD in Chapter II.  The resource as defined does provide the capability 
to authenticate identity through exploitation of technological options included in other 
forms of identity.  Additionally, the connectivity capability required by the resource 
definition provides the ability to conduct additional inspection of individuals through 
database access.  Connectivity and ability to access motor vehicle information, criminal 
histories, etc. provides the mechanism to perform on-scene identity authentication.  
Although the circumstances of incident response may make connectivity impossible, the 
exploitation of data encoded through other sources such as state motor vehicle authorities 
does provide an additional level of certainty. 
The rapid in-processing criterion is developed from the analysis of the historical 
responses to terrorism in Chapter I.  The AAR documents from both incidents detail the 
need for credentialing, but also identify its shortcomings in the responses because of the 
inordinate length of time for the identity issuance process.  The IDMT will serve to 
reduce this time through the implementation of a pre-planned, pre-designated resource 
with trained personnel to perform credentialing functions.  If this resource were 
developed in our example community from Chapter II, it would reduce, but not solve the 
problems associated with credentialing delays.  The pre-training and pre-designation 
would speed the on scene lessons learned of implementing ad-hoc systems as was 
required in the response to both case study incidents.  The Frederick County example 
shows there is a lack of cohesiveness in the issuance process or the token utilized for first 
responder identity documents.  The IDMT would most effectively function in a pre-
planned system where most of the first responders were pre-credentialed utilizing any 
number of technological options, from inexpensive bar-codes or magnetic strips to more 
expensive RFID (Radio Frequency Identifier) and smart card technologies.  Exploitable 
technologies and consistency in identity tokens are the key to rapid in-processing. 
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The IDMT as defined also does not directly address interoperability as a systemic 
problem for the issuance of pre-event/ daily use professional identity credentials.  The 
IDMT does address on-scene identity interoperability through a preplanned identity 
system that relies on technological solutions to many of the identity shortfalls outlined in 
previous incident response.  Although the resource definition does not specify the 
technology option (barcodes, biometric, smart cards, etc.), it does outline the need for 
technology options that can be read and recorded by handheld devices or remote stations.  
This requirement achieves on-scene interoperability through the ability to electronically 
verify issued credentials against the incident database that contains authorizations 
regardless of the technology option employed.  Further research and evaluation through 
exercise should be conducted into specific technologies to perform this function.  
Prescribing a technological option at this time, without testing and evaluation, would be 
presumptive.  As defined, an IDMT does account for on-scene interoperability through a 
common on-scene credential achieving interoperability regardless of the specific 
technology employed. 
The criterion for data storage/ promulgation is developed out of the need to 
connect identity and level of training for incident commanders to efficiently and 
appropriately utilize personnel to achieve tactical objectives on incident scenes.  For the 
example community in Chapter II, the IDMT would capture the data through the 
enrollment process and utilize a centralized database to link the identity token to the 
individual.  Information concerning level of training and identity would be entered into 
the database during enrollment to connect identity and level of training and be made 
available to incident command.  Depending upon the technological solution employed, 
the information would be stored in a central database or for more advance technologies 
stored directly on the token (smart cards).  As exposed during the evaluation of other 
identified criteria, the IDMT does not provide a systemic pre-event solution to the 
problem of data storage/ promulgation, but seeks to achieve the operational capability on 
the incident scene.  This represents a significant improvement over the ad-hoc solutions 
implemented at the described incident scenes, but does not provide a complete pre-event 
solution to the problem. 
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The cost criterion is developed from traditional public policy concerns.  This 
forces the problem and potential solutions to be judged in the context of the cost to solve 
the complication, verses the potential total cost of the underlying problem if left 
unsolved.  As the defined resource has not been developed and tested, a total cost has not 
been previously recorded.  The Frederick County, MD Sheriff’s Office developed cost 
estimates for the demonstration project funding proposal to the State of Maryland for a 
Type II Identity Management Team in an existing mobile asset.  The preliminary estimate 
for cost was approximately $140,000, which did not include the cost of acquiring the 
trailer.56  The estimate was developed utilizing low cost bar code technology for on-scene 
identity issuance, but maintaining the capability to read and authenticate smart card 
technology.  The estimate represents the extreme minimum for the development of an 
IDMT resource. 
Cost and political acceptability are often intertwined.  The ability to bring the 
proposed change to fruition is essential.  The development of an IDMT is not extremely 
cost prohibitive, therefore, it does not affect its ability to be politically acceptable.    In 
the context of the development of an IDMT, there are no legal or political impediments to 
the development of IDMTs for incident response.  The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency has already defined 120 response resources through the National Mutual Aid and 
Resource Management Initiative.57  These definitions have been accepted for intra and 
interstate mutual resource requests and have not resulted in strong political opposition 
from the states.  In the wake of the reviews following the response to Hurricane Katrina, 
it is likely that the resource definitions could be expanded to include additional resources, 
such as an IDMT, that have been needed in response but to date remained undefined. 
 
 
56 Proposal was submitted by the Frederick County, MD Sheriff's Office to the Maryland Anti-
Terrorism Advisory Council for consideration as part of the FY 2006 Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program (LETPP) grant application process.   
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Mutual 





















Table 4. Evaluation Matrix: Identity Management Team 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The examination of the responses to the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal 
Building bombing and the 9/11/01 Attack on the Pentagon revealed lessons learned and 
the necessary elements to form a defined response resource.  The elements were 
incorporated into the Identity Management Team resource as defined in Table 1.  The 
concept of operations was also defined, as the successful incorporation of the resource is 
dependent upon operational factors including the establishment of a strong perimeter.  
The resource demonstration project developed by the Frederick County Sheriff’s that was 
established through the examination of case studies was then evaluated utilizing 
previously identified criteria for improved terrorism incident response. 
The evaluation reveals that the defined Identity Management Team option for 
improved terrorism incident response is a vital resource; however, it does not stand alone 
as a complete solution to the identity management problems exposed in the response to 
previous incidents of terrorism.  The IDMT resource definition provides the necessary 
mechanism to successfully manage on-scene identity allowing for incremental 
improvement over the response to previous incidents of terrorism.  The effectiveness of 
the resource and terrorism incident management would be bolstered by the 
implementation of pre-event credentials that allow for rapid identity authentication.  The 
IDMT provides a mechanism to incrementally improve identity management for 
terrorism incident response.  The resource represents a deployable asset that can 
incrementally improve incident response immediately, while the details and attempts at 
larger credential standardization solutions are debated. 
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The need for a dedicated resource for on-scene identity credentialing was further 
bolstered by the events of Hurricane Katrina.  Although the focus of this paper is the 
response to incidents of terrorism, the Katrina example shows the pervasive identity 
management capability gap for catastrophic incident response including natural hazards.  
The report of the House of Representative Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina 
advised, “The Secret Service was asked by NOPD and the Louisiana State Police to take 
control of the credentialing process for state and local law enforcement in the New 
Orleans area. The need for secure credentials for NOPD was a primary concern, as many 
police officers had lost their official identification badges during the hurricane.”58  The 
IDMT resource as defined could have served a vital function in response to this 
catastrophic natural hazard event.  This example further evidences the value of the 
resource as a necessary response asset that can service events beyond terrorism response. 
In the context of cost criteria, it must be addressed as to whether this resource is 
useful for other purposes, or does it just sit and wait for an incident requiring its 
capabilities.  The described development consideration of an IDMT by the Frederick 
County Sheriff’s Office was dual purpose.  While the developed resource does close a 
tremendous gap for the law enforcement responsibility for scene security in the event of 
an incident of terrorism, it can also serve as a community service by being utilized as the 
centerpiece of a child identification program.  The IDMT mobile resource can be used at 
fairs, carnivals, and special events to register child information with law enforcement.  
This serves three purposes: the resource is utilized by and kept operational condition, 
personnel utilize the equipment and it reinforces initial training, and it provides an 
additional service to the community.  The limited investment is further leveraged in that 
it provides a resource for incident response and a community asset to capture child 
identity information, thereby increasing public value. 
Table 4 contains a summary of the evaluated criteria for the defined IDMT 
response resource.  The IDMT represents an incremental improvement in identity 
management for terrorism incident response.  The IDMT provides a mechanism to 
 
58 U.S House of Representatives, Select Bi-Partisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
the Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bi-Partisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and the Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2006), 256. 
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monumentally improve identity management when compared to previous catastrophic 







                                                
IV. FIRST RESPONDER IDENTITY SMART CARDS (OPTION 3) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The option of identity smart cards for first responders is derived from federal 
identity initiatives.  The current federal identity program is driven by the requirements of 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12: Policy for a Common Identification 
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors (HSPD-12).  HSPD-12 and supporting 
documents outline an identity paradigm shift from reliance on unverifiable paper 
credentials to a comprehensive standards based smart card program consisting of identity 
tokens that can be electronically authenticated.  The first responder identity smart card is 
developed as an option for improved terrorism incident response based on the 
implementation of this national model for all federal employees and contractors.  This 
chapter provides an overview of smart card technology and the federal HSPD-12 smart 
card program.  Finally, the HSPD-12 program and its application to first responders in the 
National Capital Region will be evaluated across the identified criteria for its capability 
to improve terrorism incident response. 
1. Smart Card Technology Overview 
Smart cards are defined as “plastic devices—about the size of a credit card—that 
use integrated circuit chips (ICC) to store and process data, much like a computer. This 
processing capability distinguishes these cards from traditional magnetic stripe cards, 
which cannot process or exchange data with automated information systems.”59  The card 
processing capability allows for applications, biometric information, and other data to be 
stored, encrypted, retrieved, and verified. 
There are two basic types of smart cards, contact and contactless.  The two terms 
describe differences in how the ICC is powered and how the data transfer takes place.  
Contact cards require the direct insertion into an interface device.  Contactless smart 
cards must only be in the proximity of the card reader for information exchange to take 
place. The transfer of data takes place over radio frequency (RF) waves that are emitted 
 
59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Electronic Government: Federal Agencies Continue to 
Invest in Smart Card Technology (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004), 1. 
through antennae contained in both the card and reader.60  Hybrid, or multi-technology 
smart cards, (Figure 2 & 3) may contain both contact and contactless ICC features as well 
as bar code and magnetic stripe technology.  The cards may be manufactured with 
different integrated chips to serve the specific needs of agencies for physical access 





Figure 2.   
                                                
Multi-Technology Smart Card (front)61 
 
60 U.S. General Services Administration, Government Smart Card Handbook (Washington, D.C.: 
GSA, 2004), 16. 




Figure 3.   
                                                
Multi-Technology Smart Card (back) 62 
 
The smart card provides the capability for an encrypted secure interface and 
identity verification through the integration of biometric data and remote network 
verification through public key infrastructure (PKI).  PKI is simply “a communications 
infrastructure that allows users to exchange money and data over the Internet in a secure 
environment.”63  PKI works on the exchange of information that is encrypted prior to 
being sent by a public key algorithm then decrypted upon receipt by the certified users 
private key algorithm.  The algorithm is issued along with a digital certificate from the 
certificate authority (system administration).  PKI has many attractive assets for cyber 
security that allows the user, based on the certificate issued, to access appropriate levels 
of information and systems. For smart cards, PKI provides a verifiable backbone that can 
provide a “check” of the card-holder status.  PKI allows for a digital certificate to be 
revoked even though a cardholder is still in possession of the card, therefore, access to 
physical and logical systems can be rescinded without physical access to the card. 
B. FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SMART CARD TECHNOLOGY 
1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 12 
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12: Policy for a Common 
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, President Bush ordered 
 
62 U.S. General Services Administration, Government Smart Card Handbook, 27. 
63 Ibid, A-6. 
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all agencies of the United States Government “to enhance security, increase Government 
efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by establishing a 
mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification 
issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors.”64  HSPD-12 further 
clarifies secure and reliable identity as consisting of the following criteria. 
Secure and reliable forms of identification for purposes of this directive 
means identification that (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying 
an individual employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, 
tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly 
authenticated electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose 
reliability has been established by an official accreditation process. The 
Standard will include graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, 
to ensure flexibility in selecting the appropriate level of security for each 
application.65
The directive further orders an aggressive program with strict timetables to be 
implemented based on standards developed by the Secretary of Commerce. 
2. Federal Information Processing Standard - 201: Personal Identity 
Verification 
The Secretary of Commerce through the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) released the HSPD-12 directed government-wide standard on 
February 25, 2005.  Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 201: Personal 
Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors (FIPS 201) outlines a 
two stage process to meet the listed criteria for a “secure and reliable form of 
identification.” The stated goal of FIPS-201 is “to achieve appropriate security assurance 
for multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals 
seeking physical access to Federally controlled government facilities and electronic 
access to government information systems.”66
The initial implementation stage, Personal Identity Verification One (PIV-I), 
includes the description of required processes to meet security and control mandates for 
 
64 Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard 
for Federal Employees and Contractors (Washington, D.C.: The White House, August 2004), 1. 
65 Ibid. 
66 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 
Employees and Contractors (Washington, DC: NIST, 2005), 1. 
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identify proofing of individuals for issuance of federal identification cards under HSPD-
12.  The federal PIV card will only be issued by accredited agencies and will utilize a 
process consisting of three necessary components. 67  First, the applicant will personally 
appear.  Second, the applicant will present two forms of identity source documents as 
certified by the Office of Management and Budget68 with at least one being issued by a 
State or Federal authority and submit to necessary biometric screening.69 Finally, the 
applicant will be screened through a National Agency Check with Written Inquiries 
(NACI), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), or National Security community 
investigation background investigation including fingerprint identification.70
The second stage of implementation outlined by FIPS-201, Personal Identity 
Verification Two (PIV-II), includes the physical and technical elements to support 
interoperability aspects of HSPD-12.  The Federal PIV card bases identity authentication 
on a three-tiered system.  The real-time comparison of biometrics (fingerprint and/or 
photographic), “something you are”, combined with the card itself, “something you have” 
and PIN numerical “something you know.”71  The tiers backed by the distribution and 
identity-proofing standards outlined by PIV-I provide a secure identity solution that 
meets the requirements mandated by HSPD-12.  The addition of PKI enabled digital 
certificate remote network verification architecture provides an additional level of 
security for both physical and logical access, as the status can be revoked without 
requiring the physical collection of the PIV card. 
The PIV card mandated by FIPS-201 consists of common physical characteristics 
and appearance elements with allowances for slight variation for specific agency 
purposes.  In an effort to standardize, the physical make-up of the card is consistent with 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical  
67 In order to be accredited agencies will be required to implement the guidelines set forth in NIST 
Special Publication 800-79 Guidelines for Certification and Accreditation of PIV Card Issuing 
Organizations. 
68 Acceptable identification documents are described on Form I-9, OMB No. 1115-0136 Employment 
Eligibility Verification. 
69 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 
Employees and Contractors, 6. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 10-11. 
Commission (IEC) requirements.  FIPS-201 contains five slightly varied approved 
models for card fronts and three variations for the back of approved PIV cards.  In 
addition to the ICC standardization aspects the models allow flexibility for the inclusion 
of magnetic stripe and/ or bar code technology for agency specific applications. Certain 
fields are mandated on the front of the PIV card such as, name, photograph, affiliation, 
agency, and expiration date. Required elements on the back of the card include card serial 




Figure 4.   
                                                
PIV Optional Card Front Data – Emergency Responder72 
 
 
72 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 




Figure 5.   
                                                
PIV Optional Card Back Data73 
 
FIPS-201 (PIV-II) also describes the technical requirements for PIV 
interoperability, with further detail provided in a series of related NIST and industry 
technical publications. There are five basic technical requirements governing the federal 
PIV card.  FIPS -201 provides standardization requirements for the ICC, a Card Holder 
Unique Identifier (CHUID), PIV Card Activation, the PIV authentication data (one 
asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate), and biometric data.  FIPS-201 
requires that the PIV card contain both contact and contactless ICC interfaces.  The ICC 





73 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 
Employees and Contractors, 22. 
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Requirements for Cryptographic Modules Standards, which when coupled with card 
reader standardization required by FIPS-201 achieves government-wide 
interoperability.74
The required CHUID must include an expiration date, asymmetric signature field, 
and Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) that uniquely identifies and 
tracks each card. The CHUID must be readable from both contact and contactless 
interfaces. FIPS-201 mandates the specific technical requirements outlined by NIST 
SP800-73: Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification for the CHUID and FASC-N be 
incorporated into PIV cards. The requirements for the asymmetric signature field must be 
encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as outlined in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force report RFC 3852 and NIST SP 800-78: Cryptographic 
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. 
The PIV card is required to include personal identification number (PIN) based 
cardholder activation.  The PIN must be accepted by the card before it will activate for 
release of biometric and asymmetric key information. The PIN must meet the standards 
outlined in FIPS PUB 140-2.  The inclusion of a PIN activated system allows for greater 
card security as the information is not transmitted until a successful contact interface and 
the correct PIN has been entered. 
The PIV card authentication data, must at minimum, consist of one asymmetric 
private key and a corresponding X.509 public key certificate75 stored on the card. All 
keys are accessed only through the contact ICC interface and must not be exportable from 
the card.  The card may also contain additional keys and PKI certificates based on 
specific agency needs.  The X.509 PKI certificate allows for remote network verification 
through Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and the Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) that must in routine situations be updated by agencies at least every eighteen 
hours. The inclusion of authentication data allows for the card certificate status to be 
verified through a secure remote network adding a strong layer of security. 
 
74 The Associated technical publications include ISO/IEC 7816, ISO/IEC 10373 (1&3), ISO/IEC 
14443 (1-4), ISO/IEC 10373 (6), Crypto-Modules FIPS 140-2. 
75 The specifications for X.509 certificates is contained in Federal Identity Credentialing Committee 
Publication: X.509 Certificate and CRL Extensions Profile for the Common Policy. 
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The final technical requirement of FIPS-201 is the inclusion of biometric data on 
the PIV card.  The following biometric information is collected during the card issuance 
process: full-set of fingerprints, electronic facial image, and two electronic fingerprints.  
The full set of fingerprints is not electronically stored and is utilized only for law 
enforcement background checks.  An electronic facial image is printed on the card face 
and may, but is not required to be, stored on the card.  Two electronic fingerprints (right 
and left index finger) are required to be included on the card for biometric authentication.  
The technical specification mandates for collection and inclusion of biometric data on the 
PIV card are located in NIST SP-800-76: Biometric Data Specification for Personal 
Identity Verification. 
The federal Personal Identity Verification project mandated by HSPD-12 and 
described by FIPS-201 provides the basis for a secure identity program far surpassing any 
current efforts to provide identity management solutions to government employees.  The 
federal program is being implemented in two stages.  Under PIV-I the process for identity 
proofing including background investigations, document requirements, and agency 
accreditation is administered.  The second stage, PIV-2, outlines the technical and 
interoperability requirements for the federal smart PIV card.  The reliance on 
interoperable smart card technological capabilities such as inclusion of biometric 
identifiers and encrypted PKI certificates provides identity verification at levels far 
beyond currently employed solutions (Figure 6).  The PIV project and its inherent 
flexibility provide a secure identity model that can be replicated as a First Responder 




Figure 6.   
                                                
PIV Card System Component Model76 
 
C. THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION FIRST RESPONDER 
AUTHENTICATION CARD (FRAC) PROGRAM 
The unique multi-jurisdictional nature of the National Capital Region has made it 
the first region to recognize the need to develop a comprehensive project to implement an 
HSPD-12/FIPS-201 based identity smart card for first response personnel.  The National 
Capital Region (NCR) consists of the District of Columbia and bordering counties from 
Maryland and Virginia.  HSPD-12 has required Federal Agencies to implement FIPS-
201, the standard has not been mandated for implementation by state and local 
governments.  The National Capital Region is the first entity to attempt to replicate the 
federal program on the State and local level.  The blurred lines of federal, state, and local 
responsibility that is unique to the region makes a common identity standard capable of 
electronic authentication a necessity.  The multi-jurisdictional nature of incident response 
in the region necessitates a common interoperable platform to authenticate identity and 
affiliation across levels of government.  The NCR project, titled the First Responder  
76 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 201: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 
Employees and Contractors, 11. 
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Authentication Card (FRAC), utilizes the standards outlined in FIPS-201 PIV-II to 
develop a platform capable of interoperability with federally issued smart identity cards. 
The NCR FRAC is based entirely on the standards outlined by FIPS-201 PIV-II. 
One of the major impediments to the implementation of a pure FIPS-201 PIV-I and PIV-
II compliant identity card for state and local first responders is the background check 
requirement.  As described in previous sections, FIPS-201 is requires a fingerprint check 
and National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) for all personnel to be issued 
a federal identity credential.  The heart of an identity trust model is the security of both 
the issuance process and the product (token).  If the model is vulnerable to infiltration 
during the issuance process, or the finished product is subject to counterfeit, there is no 
trust and authentication will be suspect.  At the state and local level the cost of 
conducting FIPS-201 compliant background investigations on all first responders would 
be exorbitant. 
In Frederick County, MD, the example community outlined in Chapter II, only 
the investigations completed prior to law enforcement employment would meet the 
standard outlined by FIPS-201.  The pre-employment identity verification procedures of 
other response disciplines including fire, EMS, public works, public health, and clinical 
care would not meet the standard.  In order to meet PIV-I enrollment standards, 
additional investigation of employees would be required.  This raises numerous concerns 
ranging from personal privacy to the significant additional associated costs.  The NCR 
FRAC has addressed this problem by delineating levels of authentication based on the 
scope of enrollment procedures.  This allows for a graduated trust model where four 
increasing levels of authentication are defined based upon the depth of procedures prior 
to credential issuance.  It does not preclude agencies with minimal procedures from 
inclusion in the program; however, when the card is electronically authenticated the level 
of authentication is displayed allowing the user to determine if additional scrutiny is 
necessary.  The graduated model ensures maximum participation among local 
governments, due to limited additional financial commitments, while maintaining trust. 
The NCR was ground-zero for a terrorist attack on 9/11/01.  The response to the 
Pentagon revealed a pervasive this identity gap, as documented in previous chapters. In 
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addition, the NCR also has the unique frequent need for identity authentication of first 
responders from dozens of agencies across all levels of government for daily operations.  
The FRAC is a necessary element in the NCR for both daily operations and the response 
to critical incidents such as those created by terrorist attack. 
The NCR FRAC program is moving through the research and evaluation stage.  In 
February 2006, exercise the interoperability through a limited enrollment and multi-
jurisdictional exercise dubbed “Winter Fox.”  The interoperability and authentication 
capability was targeted by the exercise that took place in four locations including the 
Pentagon, Port of Baltimore, Virginia Department of Transportation, and Frederick 
County, MD.  The exercise sought to examine the ability electronically validate PKI 
certificates of FIPS 201 standardized smart card through four different back end 
architectures.  The cards included in the exercise included the NCR FRAC, Maryland 
FRAC, Transportation Security Administration Transportation Worker Identity 
Credential (TSA TWIC), and the Department of Defense Common Access Card (DoD 
CAC).  Each of the identified cards are maintained through different back-end 
infrastructures.  The exercise sought to test the capability to validate personnel identity 
across the disparate infrastructures. 
The exercise utilized hand-held readers that received satellite data regarding 
certificate revocation every 24 hours.  The readers were utilized to read and validate PKI 
enabled FIPS-201 smart cards. The Winter Fox exercise resulted in 285 scans of the 
smart cards with disparate back end architectures.  Of the scans, 79 resulted in PIN 
verification failures.77  This means that 28% of the attempts were unable to be validated 
by the back-end architecture because of incorrect PIN entry, or more simply cardholder 
error.  The 206 scans where the user did not error in PIN entry resulted in 100% 
validation.  This provides strong evidence of the interoperable capability of FIPS smart 
cards.  The hand-held reader also has the ability to read, but not validate, 2D barcodes 
contained on most driver licenses.  Several driver licenses were read, but not validated as 
part of the exercise. 
 
77 Craig Wilson, "Winter Fox Interoperability Demonstration" (presentation at the meeting of the 
Government Smart Card Interagency Advisory Board, 15 March 2006), 14, 
http://www.smart.gov/iab/presentations/IABmeetingMarch2006.pdf. (accessed 18 August 2006). 
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D. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
The utilization of FIPS-201 standards with the NCR FRAC program and 
preliminary evaluation through the Winter Fox exercise, demonstrates the capability to 
institute a government-wide trust model for identity authentication.  The results of the 
exercise show promise for improvement of identity management during the response to 
large-scale terrorism incidents.  The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC will be evaluated utilizing 
the incident response criteria as developed in Chapter I.  The criteria include identity 
authentication, rapid in-processing, interoperability, and data storage/ promulgation.  In 
addition, the traditional public policy criteria of cost and political acceptability will be 
examined. 
The first element of the criteria for improved terrorism incident response is 
identity authentication.  Identity is able to be authenticated if a trust model is developed 
that allows for verification.  Trust is developed by ensuring both issuance process and 
product are sound and strongly resistant to exploitation. The PIV-I enrollment model 
outlined by FIPS-201 is resistant to exploitation through required background 
investigations and consistent processes.  The NCR/ FRAC interpretation allows for levels 
of enrollment based on the intrusiveness of enrollment procedures.  This represents a vast 
improvement in identity proofing from the current system outlined in Chapter II.  The 
issuance process, combined with the smart card standards required by FIPS-201 PIV-II 
provides a complete model of secure process and product.  The standards base allows 
identity to be verified through PKI remote electronic verification.  The FIPS-201/ NCR 
FRAC card is capable of being read by handheld readers that can instantly check the 
authenticity of the card.  Followed by user PIN entry, the card can be checked against the 
PKI directory and the certificate status responder to reveal the current status of the 
credential.  The biometric digital fingerprints stored on the card can also be utilized 
through a reader to further authenticate identity.  The three-tiered system (something you 
are, something you have, and something you know) of the PIV program provide a level 
of identity authentication that has not previously existed for terrorism incident response. 




necessary for efficient terrorism incident response and provide a countermeasure to 
prevent the terrorist/ impostor from infiltrating secure scenes through unverifiable paper 
credentials. 
The second element of the criteria for improved terrorism incident response is 
rapid in-processing.  The current identity system requires additional identity checks and 
issuance of on-scene identity credentials, whether by computer generated card, wrist-
band, or other platform that causes lengthy delays for on-scene in-processing.  The NCR 
FRAC eliminates confusion and delays and allows responders to get work on the 
problem.  Personnel identity can be verified and in-processed through a remote card 
reader that does not take longer to authenticate than the traditional flash identification and 
routine questions that follow.  The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC would eliminate the lengthy 
delays to get responders credentialed and into the incident scene.  The hand-held 
validation device utilized in the NCR Winter Fox exercise required the card to be placed 
in the device and the PIN entered by cardholder, resulting in instant verification.  The 
FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC provide a solution that allows for strong identity authentication 
without sacrificing the need for rapid in-processing of personnel. 
The third element of the criteria for improved terrorism incident response is 
interoperability.  FIPS-201 creates a standards based solution to identity management.  
The smart card standards outlined in PIV-II allow for interoperability among identity 
tokens because they all meet the same technological standards.  The NCR Winter Fox 
exercise successfully demonstrated that standards based smart cards with disparate back-
end infrastructures could be authenticated.  During the exercise, cards issued by the 
Federal Government (Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Transportation Security Administration) could interoperate with those issued by a State 
(MD FRAC).  The FIPS-201 standard provides the interoperable basis necessary to 
authenticate identity from various response disciplines and different levels of 
government.  The FIPS-201 standard allows for interoperability necessary to improve 
terrorism incident response. 
The fourth element of the criteria for improved terrorism incident response is data 
storage/ retrieval and promulgation capability.  The technical capabilities of the FIPS-
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201/ NCR FRAC smart card allow data to be transferred from the card providing the 
ability to make information on responders immediately available to on-scene command.  
Although not documented in FIPS-201, the smart card capability exists to include 
training qualification data.  As additionally identified personnel standards are developed 
under the National Incident Management System, those definitions can be included on 
the card (Firefighter I, Firefighter II, etc.).  Once developed, these standards will allow 
more information to be delivered to on-scene command following card and PIN entry in 
remote handheld devices.  The FIPS-201 smart card provides the capability to improve 
terrorism incident response through the ability to store and retrieve data related to 
personnel responding to an incident of terrorism.  This would provide the incident 
commander with information to answer the critical questions of “Who is this?” and 
“What can they do for me?” 
The traditional public policy concerns of cost and political acceptability are the 
final elements to evaluate solutions for improved terrorism incident response.  These 
criteria balance the theoretical problem solution against the financial requirements and 
willingness of political entities to implement the solution.  The public policy criteria 
bring the reality of government prioritization and choice based on budgetary constraints 
and political will.   These criteria temper the seemingly perfect solution to the identified 
problem with realities of the requirements for governmental action. 
The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC presents the option with the greatest implementation 
cost.  The current decentralized system presented in Chapter II requires no additional 
financial investment, as it is currently operated in some capacity by every level of 
government.  The Identity Management Team option presented in Chapter III requires a 
moderate investment of approximately $140,000.  The following table (Table 5) appeared 
in the April 2001 U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) publication CIO/ PKI 
Smart Card Project: Approach for Business Case Analysis of Using PKI on Smart Cards 
for Governmentwide Applications.78  The table outlines a cost estimate for PKI Smart 
Cards with biometrics for a notional agency issuing 10,000 cards and includes 1,000 
readers for physical building access and 10,000 network readers for logical access.  These 
 
78 U.S. General Services Administration, CIO PKI/Smart Card Project: Approach for Business Case 
Analysis of Using PKI on Smart Cards for Governmentwide Applications (Washington, D.C.: GSA, 2001). 
options are presented in the publication as comprehensive solutions to identity 
management for identity authentication and protection of physical and logical 
governmental assets.  The costs are based on FY 2001 estimates. 
Unit Cost Quantity Total Cost
Cost of tokens 15$                    10,000 150,000$             
Cost of network readers 125$                  10,000 1,250,000$          
Cost of building access readers 200$                  1,000 200,000$             
Cost of infrastructure 300,000$           300,000$             
Cost of issuing certificates 125,000$           125,000$             
Total Cost of Option D (constant dollars) 2,025,000$          
Option D - Agency Opts for PKI/Smart Cards and Biometrics
Table 5. Total Costs for PKI/ Smart Cards and Biometrics for Notional Agency79 
 
The use of FY 2001 cost estimates would intuitively lead to the conclusion that 
costs would be significantly higher for FY 2007 implementation.  The application of 
Moore’s law to the problem concludes that the costs of would decrease because of the 
rapid advance of technology and lower costs of production.80  The cost of smart cards has 
decreased.  According to the February 2004 GSA Government Smart Card Handbook the 
cost per card is listed between $3 and $10 depending on card capabilities as compared to 
$15 in the FY 2001 estimate. 
Utilizing Frederick County, MD as described in Chapter II for a baseline, 
implementation costs are below $500,000 (Table 6).  Frederick County has fewer 
employees than the estimate provided for the notional agency in the GSA publication.  
The table below (Table 6) represents the costs associated with implementation for the 
example community with approximately 2,500 employees.  The example community has 
an FY 2006 operating budget of approximately $361,000,000, a total investment in smart 




                                                 
79 U.S. General Services Administration, CIO PKI/Smart Card Project, 4-8. 
80 Gordon E. Moore, "Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits," Electronics, 19 April 
1965. 
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Frederick County, MD: PKI / Smart Cards and Biometrics   
      
  Unit Cost Quantity Total Cost 
Cost of Tokens  $                       10  2500  $                 25,000  
Cost of Network Readers  $                      125 2500  $               312,500  
Cost of Building Access Readers  $                      200 250  $                 50,000  
Cost of Infrastructure  $                 75,000   $                 75,000  
Cost of Issuing Certificates  $                 31,250   $                 31,250  
      
Total Cost of Implementation      $           493,750.00  
Table 6. PKI/ Smart Cards Implementation Estimate: Frederick County, MD 
 
The total cost of implementing PKI enabled smart cards is significant, but not cost 
prohibitive.  Not accounted for in the estimates above are the costs associated with the 
existing identity system.  When factoring in the costs associated with the legacy system, 
although likely not significant, the implementation costs are slightly reduced.  As is true 
for most municipal governments, identity management is not a consolidated function, 
does not exist as a budgetary line item, and is absorbed in operating costs, therefore, a 
total expenditure is difficult to ascertain.  In addition to the cost of the legacy system, 
leveraging federal grant funds available through the State Homeland Security Grant 
Program and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program can supplement a local 
investment lessening the local budgetary impact. 
The cost of background investigations is also not included in the implementation 
costs.  The NCR FRAC solution related to levels of authentication based on depth of 
investigation, is the preferred option as opposed to the FIPS-201 PIV-I requirements.  
The costs of PIV-I background investigation requirements would be exorbitant for local 
governments, making smart card implementation unattainable.  The NCR FRAC program 
leveled determination presents a common sense solution to identity authentication that 
balances security, fiscal responsibility, and political acceptability. 
The final element of the criteria for evaluation is political acceptability.  As stated 
in previous chapters, cost is often intertwined with political acceptability.  In the case of 
the FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC this is also true.  The program also raises privacy concerns 
that could potentially impact the acceptability of the option.  There are also additional 
concerns related to the method of implementation for a nationwide program that can 
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affect the program acceptability.  Although the program has not been designed, the 
method of implementation, whether by mandate or voluntary compliance, can impact 
state and local government willingness to accept the program. 
The key component as it relates to the cost/ political acceptability is increasing 
public value.  The outlined FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC option adds value in that it provides 
solutions to many of the problems associated with terrorism incident response, but it also 
provides additional benefits to terrorism prevention and protection missions, and cost 
saving to other government operations.  The smart card option provides the opportunity 
for vastly improved protection of physical and logical assets, and increases overall 
government efficiency. 
The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC smart card option provides additional benefits 
through the ability to improve physical access control at government facilities 
nationwide.  The United States General Accounting Office report Security: Breaches at 
Federal Agencies and Airports details the success of undercover agents in penetrating 
nineteen federal buildings and two commercial airports without screening, through the 
use of fraudulent law enforcement credentials.  The report states “At the 21 sites that our 
undercover agents successfully penetrated, they could have carried in weapons, listening 
devices, explosives, chemical/biological agents, devices, and/or other such 
items/materials.”81  The report details another dimension of the identity management 
capability gap that can be addressed by the broad application of credentials capable of 
electronic authentication.  This is possible through the implementation of PKI enabled 
smart card technology for the protection of critical infrastructures.  A comprehensive 
identity management program utilizing FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC smart card technology 
will prevent those agents or terrorists of the future from penetrating secure sites through 
unverifiable fraudulent credentials. 
The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC option also provides the ability to improve 
information system security through incorporating card readers into computer access.  
Incorporated with physical access control the system provides two layers of security for 
logical systems.  The first hurdle for a potential assailant is entering the physical location; 
 
81 U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of Special Investigations, Security: Breaches at Federal 
Agencies and Airports (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2000), 3. 
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then, the computer card reader option provides a second level of security.  An 
incorporated smart card option decreases the potential for cyber attack through on-site 
infiltration through this two-layer process. 
The FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC option also provides benefits to other government 
operations.  The CIO/ PKI Smart Card Project: Approach for Business Case Analysis of 
Using PKI on Smart Cards for Governmentwide Applications identifies that 
implementing smart card technology with digital forms improves efficiency “reduces 
paperwork, eliminates redundant data entry, and improves data accuracy as transcribing 
and data entry errors are eliminated”82  A smart card based system implemented with e-
government initiatives creates public value and cost savings in other areas of government 
processes.  The many additional benefits of the implementation of smart card technology 
address concerns of cost relative to the public value it creates. 
Other elements of a FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC based smart card program that raise 
political acceptability concerns are the issues of personal privacy and the method of 
implementation.  The enrollment process, storage of data, and access to data are concerns 
that will be raised by privacy advocates relative to the implementation of a smart card 
based program.  The technical specifications of the card as outlined by FIPS-201 PIV II, 
including the requirement for PIN activation through a contact reader for data retrieval, 
provides for data protection on the card.  The larger concerns come from the storage of 
data gathered through the enrollment process.  The interoperable nature of the standards 
based system allows for the data to be housed with the host organization, easing concerns 
of national information databases.  In order to fully address these concerns, stringent 
policy must be in place prior to implementation.  In development of the Transportation 
Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program the Transportation Security Administration 
developed a Privacy Impact Assessment that describes the protections. The following is 
an excerpt. 
All collected data will be electronically stored in one location, and no 
paper copies will be maintained. The data collected during enrollment will 
be encrypted before transmission and then transmitted to the TSA system 
over a secure internet connection. The data is then automatically deleted 
from the Trusted Agent enrollment workstation. Once the information is  
82 U.S. General Services Administration, CIO PKI/Smart Card Project, 5-6. 
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sent to TSA, the information will be forwarded to the various interfaces to 
conduct the security threat assessment. After the card production facility 
produces the credential, the data will be automatically deleted from the 
card production facility system. Personal information collected will not be 
stored outside the TSA system except when it is actually being used by 
other parts of the system.83
The TSA program addresses concerns by describing its data security measures.  In order 
for a FIPS-201 /NCR FRAC model program to be accepted by state and local 
governments, these type of assurances must be developed. 
The final dimension of political acceptability is the method of implementation.  
The FIPS-201 model is a requirement of federal government agencies under HSPD-12.  
This is well within the power of the President to require action by federal agencies.  In 
the NCR, the FIPS-201 base model with local modification of PIV-I requirements was by 
necessity and choice.   The NCR has dedicated a portion of its Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) funds to develop the project after recognizing its importance.  The 
development of a nationwide program must follow a similar pattern.  The standards and 
best practices for implementation must be available for review and adoption by interested 
governments.  The issue is critically important; however, it will not be successfully 
implemented by force from the federal government. 
The federal government can initially encourage adoption through grants and the 
recognition of secure identity solutions for first responders as a national priority through 
inclusion as a future focus area of the National Preparedness Goal.  The lessons learned 
from the nationwide federal agency implementation of HSPD-12 / FIPS-201 will be 
critical to successfully launching a national voluntary program to improve first responder 
identity.  To prescribe the implementation of such a program at the state and local level 
without the benefit of the federal government implementation experience would be 
senseless and lead to waste.  The implementation of the federal program will reveal best 
practices and lessons learned that will provide the roadmap to success.  In addition, 
programs such as the NCR FRAC provide guidance for the development of identity 
standards and a trust model that makes sense for state and local governments. 
 
83 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Privacy Impact 
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Table 7. Evaluation Matrix: FIPS 201/ NCR FRAC Smart Card 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter details the smart card technology option for improving first 
responder identity management for terrorism incident response.  The technology is 
reviewed and two specific smart card technology programs further explored.  The federal 
program under HSPD-12 is detailed including the guiding technical document FIPS-201.  
The local implementation of a FIPS-201 based First Responder Authentication Card in 
the National Capital Region is also examined. 
The evaluation of smart card technology under the FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC models 
revealed its vast capability to improve terrorism incident response. Smart card 
capabilities to perform identity authentication, rapid in-processing, interoperability, and 
data storage/ promulgation ability provide it with the necessary attributes to vastly 
improve terrorism incident response.  The questions of public policy, however, temper 
the clear choice for incident response improvement with concerns related to cost and 
political acceptability.  Concerns related to the overall cost were examined and revealed 
that despite higher implementation investment, the option increases public value.  Smart 
standards based smart card technology provides additional benefits to the protection of 
physical and logical assets from terrorism.  It also allows for the implementation of e-
government initiatives that can increase overall efficiency of government, thereby 
increasing public value.  The areas of concern related to political acceptability include 
both privacy and the method of implementation.  The privacy concerns are addresses 
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through two mechanisms.  First, the technical specifications of the smart card provides 
for data security.  Second, the concerns related to data security collected through the 
enrollment process will need to be addressed through strong policies related to access and 
data security as provided through the example of the TSA TWIC program. 
Standards based smart card technology for the identity of first responders has the 
ability to improve incident response and provide benefits to other aspects of government 
operations. The technology as part of a larger systems approach to identity has the 
capability to authenticate on-scene identity and facilitate on-scene identity management 
needs including personnel accountability, jurisdictional reimbursement, and personnel 
compensation.  As with many aspects of Homeland Security this is only a part of the 
overall problem of identity management for terrorism incident response.  The key 
questions for incident commander as identified in earlier chapters of “who are you?” and 
“what can you do for me” lie beyond the capabilities of technology and require political 
agreement and a willingness to improve overall preparedness. Smart cards provide the 
capability to store data, but the definitions of the data and what it will mean to on-scene 




                                                
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In his book Alice in Wonderland, author Lewis Carroll wrote, “If you don’t know 
where you are going, then it does not matter which road you take.” The previous chapters 
serve as the initial survey for a new road to the future of identity management for 
terrorism incident response.  The course is defined by examining how identity 
management has failed in the previous response to incidents of terrorism, and how it will 
fail in the future without a concerted effort to engage deficiencies.  The future requires 
problem recognition, field evaluation, and a decisive course toward a future vision.  
Understanding the deficiencies of the past and breaking the identity management cycle of 
failure that appears again and again in our after-action recommendations and “lessons 
learned” is critical to our future success. 
Methods are needed to manage the two distinct aspects of identity as they relate to 
response to incidents of terrorism.  The question of identity hinges on definitional 
aspects. First, is “the collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a thing is 
definitively recognizable or known.”84  Second, is “the set of behavioral or personal 
characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of a group.”85  
Essentially it comes down to, “how do we know you are you?” and “how do we know 
your affiliation and what you can do?”  These definitional aspects transfer to terrorism 
incident response in the two key answers needed by on–scene commanders managing 
personnel in responding to incidents of terrorism.  The key questions as identified in 
Chapter I are “Who is this?” and “What can they do for me?”  These key questions are 
necessary in any incident response; however, in the response to an incident of terrorism 
and the threat of secondary attack the question “who is this?” requires a follow up 
question of “is this a friend or enemy?”  The nature of incident response requires a 
process that provides trusted answers rapidly. 
The evaluation of presented alternatives leads to a conclusion requiring another 
literary reference.  The alternatives are not unlike the bowls of porridge in the childhood 
 
84 American Heritage Dictionary, "Identity." 
85 Ibid. 
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fairytale story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears.  They are too hot, too cold, and just 
right.  The problem lies in which lens you use to examine the problem, or check the 
temperature.  The terrorism incident response criteria, absent public policy 
considerations, presents an obvious choice, conversely public policy concerns absent 
incident response improvement criteria also presents an obvious but different choice.  
The federal government under HSPD-12 has defined the future of identity, providing the 
destination.  The road to get there for local governments has yet to be paved and is filled 
with potholes and detours.  The journey will be long and hard, but the trip will be 
worthwhile. 
There are no strong arguments for the status of identity at the state and local level 
to remain unchanged.  The current system provides little in the way of public value and 
no benefit to terrorism incident response.  It also provides little protection of physical and 
logical assets.  It exists simply because of its low cost.  It is broken, so it is time to fix it.  
The federal government has recognized this problem evidenced by HSPD-12 and the 
FIPS-201 smart card program.  The course has been set for the federal government, as it 
will issue smart cards to more than two million federal civilian employees and 
contractors, supported by the more than five million already issued by the Department of 
Defense to members of the armed forces and their dependents. 
The federal effort as described in HSPD-12 sets its identity standard with the 
goals “to enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and 
protect personal privacy.”  As revealed by the analysis in Chapter IV, it can also serve to 
vastly improve terrorism incident response.  The challenges for state and local 
governments, as revealed through the evaluation of public policy criteria, do not 
outweigh the public benefit of a standards based system that allows for interoperability 
between levels of governments, vastly improves terrorism incident response, increases 
physical and logical protection of assets, and provides a mechanism for increased 
government efficiency.  The construct of identity for first responders must change.  The 
identity characteristics of “flash” identification, vehicle, uniform, and a demeanor 
consistent with position must be exchanged for secure identity tokens and verification.  
The risk is too great for the paradigm to remain unchanged. 
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The following represent recommendations for the path toward improved terrorism 
incident response. 
1.  Develop an Identity Management Team (IDMT) as typed resource for   
incident response 
The implementation of a nationwide interoperable identity solution will take years 
and will likely never achieve complete participation by all state and local jurisdictions.  
On-scene identity management is a current capability gap that must be addressed.  The 
IDMT can serve to make improvement toward closing this gap in a formalized way.  The 
IDMT resource definition, developed out of the on-scene experience of responders who 
instituted ad-hoc systems from available materials, provide lessons for an incremental 
improvement.  The great leap forward presented by the FIPS-201/ NCR FRAC option 
will take years to implement.  Although not a complete solution, the IDMT is an option 
that can be immediately implemented to provide a modest improvement to identity 
management for terrorism incident response.  The IDMT resource definition developed in 
Chapter III presents a starting point to be further developed and refined through 
evaluation and exercise. 
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should task the U.S. 
Secret Service (USSS) with the development of the resource definition and equipment 
recommendations.  The USSS experience in providing credentialing support to countless 
National Security Special Events and the responses to both the 9/11 attack on the 
Pentagon and Hurricane Katrina places it in the unique position of knowing the most 
about this problem.  The identity management capability gap for terrorism incident 
response needs both an immediate and long-term solution.  The IDMT represents a short 
term option for incremental improvement in terrorism incident response and should be 
further developed. 
2.  Develop personnel credentialing standards for all response and recovery 
disciplines. 
The Coordinating Agency for each of the fifteen Emergency Support Functions 
(ESF) identified in the National Response Plan should develop credentialing standards 
for personnel in conjunction with State and local partners.  Those responsible for the 
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function should be required to develop the definition of qualifications necessary to 
deliver services within its functional area.  The efforts of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services through its ESAR-VHP program have resulted in credentialing 
standards for personnel in ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services.  The program 
should be replicated by the other ESF areas to ensure preparedness and capability to 
deliver services in the event of a terrorist incident or other catastrophic event. 
The NIMS Integration Center has begun the process of creating credentialing 
standards for certain job titles.  These areas include incident management, emergency 
medical services, fire/HazMat, law enforcement, medical and public health, public works, 
search and rescue, and animal health emergencies response.  The NIMS Integration 
Center should serve as the clearinghouse for the final product; however, the development 
should be tasked to those responsible for delivery of the function in the time of crisis.  
Development by ESF ensures that critical mission areas will not be overlooked and 
develops accountability, as the ESFs represent the range of services needed to respond to 
a crisis.  Accountability is developed as the failure to engage the credentialing question 
creates an avenue for post-incident scrutiny for the ESF lead. 
3.  Develop Model Communities and e-government Best Practices Utilizing 
FIPS-201 / NCR FRAC framework. 
The development of FIPS-201 / NCR FRAC identity tokens at the state and local 
level will require testing, evaluation, and best practices.  This can be accomplished by 
developing model communities.  The NCR FRAC is one example although full 
implementation has not yet been achieved.  The NCR represents a major city program, it 
also must be replicated in suburban and rural communities to show its applicability. The 
goals of the model communities will be to develop best practices through integration of 
smart card capabilities to develop e-government initiatives that increase efficiency and 
streamline processes.  The cornerstone to national acceptance will be the public value that 
is created through more efficient government.  In addition to the obvious benefits to 
terrorism protection, prevention, and response missions, the capabilities of smart cards 
represent an opportunity for a revolution in government administration. 
73 
The model communities will also test incident response capabilities of the cards.  
Through exercise, the data definitions needed to support incident response can be 
developed and refined.   Emergency Assistance Compact (EMAC) assistance can also be 
exercised between the model communities to evaluate interoperability for catastrophic 
response.  The best practices developed in model communities for both routine 
government processes and incident response will be the keys to future success. 
4.  Develop National Rollout model based on successful local implementation. 
The developments and best practices of the model communities will drive 
national implementation.  The lessons learned from the model communities will be 
incorporated and refined to develop a final product for national implementation.  The 
framework and processes can be developed, but the program implementation must remain 
a local government option.  
5.  Add Identity Management as a capability specific priority of the National 
Preparedness Goal. 
The Interim National Preparedness Goal currently identifies overarching and 
capability specific priorities.  The three overarching priorities include implementing the 
National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan, expanded 
regional collaboration, and implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
The four capability specific priorities include strengthening information sharing and 
collaboration, interoperable communications, CBRNE detection, response, and 
decontamination, and medical surge and mass prophylaxis.  The credentialing standards 
developed by the ESF groups and the national rollout model derived from best practices 
in example communities will provide the road map for implementation.  The inclusion of 
Identity Management as a national priority will provide a focus and allow communities to 
develop the model locally, leveraging federal homeland security funding with legacy 
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